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EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND
EXTRANATIONALITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
ZACHARY D. CLOPTON*
International lawyers are familiar with the concept of
extraterritoriality the application of one country’s laws to persons,
conduct, or relationships outside of that country. Yet the transborder
application of law is not limited to international cases. In many states, the
presence of indigenous peoples, often within defined borders, creates an
analogous puzzle. This Article begins a comparative study of foreign- and
native-affairs law by examining the application of domestic laws to foreign
facts (“extraterritoriality”) and to indigenous peoples, often called
“nations” (“extranationality”). Using a distinctive double-comparative
perspective, this Article analyzes extraterritoriality and extranationality
across three countries: the United States, Canada, and Australia.
Part I addresses the treatment of extraterritoriality across these three
countries. Part II does the same for extranationality. These comparative
law analyses pay special attention to the sources of the legal regimes and
to the similarities and differences among the three countries’ approaches.
But comparative law is not only a tool to evaluate extraterritoriality and
extranationality separately; it is also a tool to compare approaches toward
foreign affairs with approaches toward indigenous peoples—here
embodied in a presumption against extraterritoriality and a presumption in
favor of extranationality. Part III takes up this task, focusing on
sovereignty, separation of powers, and due process in the context of these
rules. Finally, Part IV identifies practical lessons drawn from the manifold
approaches to these related issues. In sum, this Article launches a new
double-comparative enterprise and, in the process, offers policy proposals
derived from the study of the American, Canadian, and Australian
approaches to extraterritoriality and extranationality.
* Assistant United States Attorney, Civil Division, Northern District of Illinois, and Lecturer in Law,
University of Chicago Law School. This Article was written by the author in his personal capacity and
represents the views of the author only, not his employers. The views expressed in this Article do not
reflect any position, policy, opinion, or view of the United States Attorney’s Office, the United States
Department of Justice, or any other agency or organization. I am grateful for the assistance of the
Honorable Diane P. Wood, Stephen B. Burbank, Katherine J. Florey, A. Daniel Tarlock, Robert J.
Currie, Katherine D. Kinzler, and the participants in the American Society of Comparative Law’s New
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INTRODUCTION
International lawyers, courts, and scholars have paid significant
attention to the issue of extraterritoriality. As this Article uses the term,
extraterritoriality refers to the application of the laws of one country to
persons, conduct, or relationships outside of that country. The classic
example is the gunman standing in one state and shooting someone across
the border in another state, though globalization has increased both the
quantity of transnational interactions and the interest of states in regulating
them. The question for courts is how best to determine whether particular
laws apply to cases in which some of the relevant facts are located outside
the territorial borders of the state. When a law does not specify its
geographic reach, what limits (if any) will courts place on its application?
The gun-across-the-border hypothetical is not only relevant to foreignaffairs cases; it is also applicable to indigenous-peoples law. We just as
easily could ask whether a law touches cases across the borders of an
Indian reservation. The question of extraterritoriality, therefore, can also be
asked in this context: under what circumstances will a court apply domestic
laws to cases with a connection to native lands or populations? For
convenience, this Article refers to the application of domestic law to native
peoples (often characterized as “nations”) as “extranationality.”1
Despite
the
similarities
between
extraterritoriality
and
extranationality—and between foreign- and native-affairs law generally2—
scholars have not taken full advantage of this comparison. This Article
takes up this task by comparing extraterritoriality and extranationality
across three common law countries with significant native populations: the
United States, Canada, and Australia. This double-comparative approach,
therefore, assesses the effect of borders on the geographic reach of
ambiguous statutes in two different settings (extraterritorial and
extranational cases) in each of three countries (United States, Canada, and
Australia).
The purposes of this double-comparative project are twofold. First,
comparing analogous issues in foreign- and native-affairs law may help
explain the structures of these relationships. This Article serves as a model

1. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832) (“The very term ‘nation,’
so generally applied to [Indian nations], means ‘a people distinct from others.’ . . . The words ‘treaty’
and ‘nation’ are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by
ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we
have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.”).
2. For a discussion of the relationships between these areas of law, see infra Part II.
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for future double-comparative research,3 and also deploys this method with
respect to the particular issues of extraterritoriality and extranationality. A
second goal is to develop public policy strategies for transborder law. This
Article can serve as a model for future policy innovation, and can also offer
suggestions for policymaking with respect to extraterritoriality and
extranationality. In this Article, each of the six iterations (extraterritoriality
and extranationality in three countries) represents a potential source of
ideas for legislative, executive, and judicial actors in both fields.
To achieve these goals, this Article begins with separate surveys of
extraterritoriality and extranationality. Part I reviews the well-worn
question of extraterritoriality, but does so using a comparative law
approach that is uncommon to this inquiry.4 Part II does the same for
extranationality. Within each Part, Sections A, B, and C cover the United
States, Canada, and Australia, respectively. One way to look at this
information is to compare approaches to extraterritoriality or
extranationality separately. For convenience, this task is taken up following
each three-country survey: comparative extraterritoriality in Part I, Section
D, and comparative extranationality in Part II, Section D. As described
below, the three countries’ courts take relatively similar approaches to
extraterritoriality—default presumptions against extraterritoriality and
some reflection of international jurisdictional rules—with interesting
variations among their applications and sources. Meanwhile, the countries
are more varied in their approaches to extranationality, although the default
rules suggest that ambiguous statutes apply to native peoples cases unless
the conditions of an exception are satisfied.
Part III then compares extraterritoriality and extranationality. This Part
offers some early conclusions about the relationship between legal rules
and attitudes toward international and tribal affairs, and also suggests future
double-comparative research that can continue to fill out our understanding
of the relationships between international and indigenous peoples law. In
3. For example, future studies can ask these same questions as applied to topics like sovereign
immunity, personal jurisdiction, forum and venue, abstention, and prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, a
notable exception to the dearth of scholarship comparing international and native-peoples law contrasts
tribal immunity with foreign sovereign immunity and domestic sovereign immunity (under U.S. law
only). See generally Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the
Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595 (2010) [hereinafter Florey, Indian Country].
4. Professor Keitner’s recent article is an outlier in this respect, comparing the approaches of
courts in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to the question of the geographic reach of
constitutional rights. See Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 55 (2011).
See also Maria L. Banda, Note, On the Water’s Edge? A Comparative Study of the Influence of
International Law and the Extraterritorial Reach of Domestic Laws in the War on Terror
Jurisprudence, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 525 (2010) (addressing a similar issue). This question, though, is
different from the issues of statutory interpretation and legislative jurisdiction discussed in this Article.
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particular, this Article assesses the roles of sovereignty, the separation of
powers, and due process in extraterritorial and extranational cases, and
suggests that these interests (and others) may serve as touchstones for
further double-comparative analyses.
Finally, Part IV derives practical recommendations from this Article’s
six-part study. This Part offers a menu of options to legislators, executive
actors, courts, and litigants addressing extraterritoriality or extranationality.
These include, among others, the codification of the presumptions, a
discussion of Chevron-style deference in extraterritorial and extranational
cases, and the inculcation of the international law of jurisdiction into the
executive’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
In sum, this Article endeavors to launch a new comparative law
enterprise and, in the process, it offers proposals to policy actors derived
from the study of the American, Canadian, and Australian approaches to
two not-so-dissimilar topics: extraterritoriality and extranationality.
I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY
A lawsuit is filed seeking to enforce a domestic statute on parties,
conduct, or relationships outside the territorial borders of the forum state.
Courts must resolve a series of questions about the suit. At or near the top
of the list: does the legislature have the power to make a law that applies to
the extraterritorial case? If the answer is yes, then the court must determine
whether the legislature chose to do so with the law in question. Since few
statutes include express statements of geographic scope, the judiciary must
construe the law by relying on extra-statutory sources such as legislative
history, canons of construction, or other statutes. This Part explores how
the American, Canadian, and Australian legal systems answer these
questions about the extraterritorial application of law. It concludes in
Section D with brief remarks comparing the three approaches, raising
themes that this Article returns to in Parts III and IV.5
A. The United States
In U.S. law, questions of extraterritoriality are not, for the most part,

5. Before turning to the substance, one brief terminological note merits attention. The term
“jurisdiction” has created confusion—or at least has been prone to misuse—in English-speaking courts,
including in cases discussing the extraterritorial reach of statutes. E.g., Lipohar v R [1999] HCA 65,
(1995) 200 CLR. 485, ¶152 (Austl.) (Kirby, J.) (“It is trite to say that the word ‘jurisdiction’ is often
used in legal discourse in different senses.”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 812-13
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between subject-matter jurisdiction and extraterritoriality,
which “has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the courts.”). This Article avoids using the term
“jurisdiction” without a modifier (e.g. territorial, legislative, subject-matter) to clarify its meaning.
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questions of authority.6 There is no dispute that Congress has the
constitutional authority to enact extraterritorial legislation;7 however,
having power and exercising it are two very different things. Some statutes
are clearly extraterritorial and some are clearly not.8 In most cases, though,
Congress does not clearly express its intent. To disambiguate such statutes,
the Supreme Court has endorsed two canons of statutory interpretation: the
Charming Betsy canon and the presumption against extraterritoriality.
These two separate rules guide courts asking whether an ambiguous statute
applies extraterritorially.
The Charming Betsy canon gets its name from the 1804 Supreme
Court decision in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy.9 This case asked
whether Jared Shattuck and his schooner flying under the Danish flag fell
within the scope of the Nonintercourse Act, which restricted trade with
France and its dependencies. Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the act
did not apply to these facts. Citing the principle that “an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains,” Marshall held that the Nonintercourse Act
could not apply to Shattuck because his capture would violate international
norms on the capture of neutrals.10 Moving forward, the Charming Betsy
canon has been understood to direct courts to choose a reasonable

6. Some courts have discussed potential substantive due process constraints on the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir.
1990); Tamari v. Bache & Co. S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1107 n.11 (7th Cir. 1984). Yet according to a
leading textbook on international litigation, “no reported federal court decision has held an
extraterritorial application of substantive U.S. law unconstitutional.” GARY B. BORN & PETER B.
RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 579 (4th ed. 2007). For
further discussion, see Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV.
1019 (2011); Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism
and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 186 (2007)
(discussing “structural” and due-process constitutional limits); A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits
on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 379 (1997); Lea Brilmayer &
Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1217 (1992).
7. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) [hereinafter “Aramco”];
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 579 n.7 (1953). The authority of U.S. states is a thornier issue. See
Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality
Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 (2009) [hereinafter Florey,
State Courts]; Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1133 (2010); Katherine Florey, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered: A Reply, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1157 (2010).
8. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS 94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 37-60 (Mar. 26, 2010) (cataloging extraterritorial criminal
laws).
9. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
10. Id. at 118.
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construction of an ambiguous statute consistent with international law.11
Because Charming Betsy requires courts to look to international law
as a tool of statutory interpretation, in extraterritorial cases the courts must
look to the international law of prescriptive jurisdiction.12 This is not the
forum to exhaustively review that body of law, but, in short, it limits a
state’s legislative reach and, in this way, evinces respect to other sovereigns
that may have an interest in regulating the person or conduct at issue. More
specifically, the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law provides that
a state’s prescriptive jurisdiction may be based on: (1) territoriality—the
conduct occurred within the state’s territory; (2) nationality—the actor was
a national of the state; (3) objective territoriality—the conduct had effects
within the state’s territory; (4) passive personality—the conduct is directed
against the state or its vital interests; or (5) universal jurisdiction—the
conduct is a type that all states may regulate.13 Combining Charming Betsy
with limits on prescriptive jurisdiction establishes the following rule of
construction: “Though it clearly has constitutional authority to do so,
Congress is generally presumed not to have exceeded those customary
international law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe.”14 Again, this is not a
rule limiting the authority of Congress.15 Rather, it is a rule of
construction—courts will construe an ambiguous statute to apply
extraterritorially only if such an interpretation does not exceed the
international law limits on prescriptive jurisdiction.
Running parallel to this rule is a separate canon known as the
presumption against extraterritoriality.16 As the name suggests, this rule
provides that ambiguous statutes are presumed not to apply
extraterritorially. As the Court has often repeated, “legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial

11. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr., 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (calling the canon
“beyond debate”).
12. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401
(1986) (defining prescriptive jurisdiction as the power “to make its law applicable to the activities,
relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive
act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court”).
13. Id.§§ 401, 402, 404 (1986). For a more in depth discussion of prescriptive jurisdiction, see
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 572-622 (Cambridge Univ. Press,5th ed. 2003); Gary B.
Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1 (19921993).
14. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. See, e.g., id.; Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953).
16. For a discussion of different outcomes under the twin canons, see Zachary D. Clopton,
Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal Law after Morrison v. National
Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137 (2011).
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jurisdiction of the United States.”17 Although scholars have offered a host
of justifications for this rule,18 recently the Court has maintained that the
presumption is grounded in the desire to avoid potential conflicts with
foreign laws and the assumption that Congress attends primarily to
domestic issues.19
How does the presumption work in practice? Imagine a litigant
seeking to apply a domestic statute to arguably extraterritorial facts. A
court’s decision will turn on two axes. First, recall that the presumption is
self-limited: it only applies if Congress has not indicated that the statute
applies extraterritorially. If the litigant can show that Congress so
indicated, she has “overcome” the presumption. Recent Supreme Court
decisions have set a high bar to “overcome” the presumption, requiring
either a “clear statement”20 or at least a “clear indication”21 of
congressional intent to legislate extraterritorially.
The other axis addresses whether the presumption applies in the first
place. Perhaps the purportedly extraterritorial case is in fact territorial in
some meaningful way, in which case the presumption against
extraterritoriality would be irrelevant. Indeed, as Justice Scalia noted in the
recent Morrison decision, “it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial
application that lacks all contact with the territory of the United States. But
the presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven

17. Aramco, 499 U.S. 241, 248 (quoting Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949)). See also Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993); Smith v. United States,
507 US 197 (1993); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 582-89 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
18. See, e.g., Born, supra note 13, at 9-21; William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 112-23 (1998).
19. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (noting that the canon “serves to protect against unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord” and that
Congress “is primarily concerned with domestic conditions”) (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963) and quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285,
respectively). But see Dodge, supra note 18 at 116 (citing Smith, 507 U.S. at (applying the presumption
without risk of conflict with foreign law); Sale, 509 U.S. 155 (same); and Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. 764
(not applying the presumption when there was a risk of conflict with foreign law)).
20. Aramco, 449 U.S. at 258 (“Congress’ awareness of the need to make a clear statement that a
statute applies overseas is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions on which it has expressly
legislated the extraterritorial application of a statute.”) (emphasis added); But see id. at 261-66
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s alleged clear-statement rule).
21. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct 2869, 2883 (2010) (“But we do not say, as
the concurrence seems to think, that the presumption against extraterritoriality is a ‘clear statement
rule,’ if by that is meant a requirement that a statute say ‘this law applies abroad.’ Assuredly context
can be consulted as well. But whatever sources of statutory meaning one consults to give ‘the most
faithful reading’ of the text, there is no clear indication of extraterritoriality here.”) (internal citations
omitted). But see id. at 2891 (Stevens, J., concurring) (characterizing the majority as “transform[ing]
the presumption from a flexible rule of thumb into something more like a clear statement rule”).
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watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic
activity is involved in the case.”22 How then do we know if a case is
territorial or extraterritorial? For years, at least for a certain class of cases,
courts followed the Second Circuit’s conduct-and-effects test, asking
whether there was any conduct or effect in the United States that would
qualify the case as territorial.23 In Morrison, the Court announced a new
answer to this question: the presumption against extraterritoriality applies
only when the activity that represents the “focus” of the statute occurs
outside the United States.24 For example, the Court said that the “focus” of
Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act is the allegedly fraudulent
securities transaction, and thus the presumption only applies to cases where
the relevant transaction is abroad, even if significant aspects of the case had
territorial connections to the United States.25 A litigant may attempt to
“avoid” the presumption by characterizing her case as territorial, but after
Morrison, courts making that determination can look only to the focus of
the statute, not to all the facts of the case.26
In sum, Congress can legislate extraterritorially and the courts will
enforce expressly extraterritorial statutes. When congressional intent with
respect to extraterritoriality is not clear, courts resort to the twin canons.
The Charming Betsy rule says that courts should select reasonable
interpretations of statutes consistent with the international law of
prescriptive jurisdiction; the presumption against extraterritorially tells
courts to presume that ambiguous statutes apply only territorially. In recent
decisions, the Court has announced rules that curtail the extraterritorial
reach of ambiguous statutes—making it harder for a litigant to apply a
statute extraterritorially by raising the bar to “overcome” the presumption
(only by showing the clear indication of congressional intent) and by
limiting the class of connections to the United States that may “avoid” the
presumption (only where the conduct comprising the “focus” of the statute
is territorial).

22. Id. at 2884 (majority opinion) (emphasis in original).
23. See id. at 2878-81 (discussing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 392 (2d Cir.
1967) and Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972)).
24. Id. at 288486. This approach seems to track what other courts have called the “gist of the
offense” rule. See, e.g., Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R.178 ¶ 144 (Can.) (rejecting this
approach). Recognizing the significance of the new focus test, Justice Stevens referred to it as the “real
motor” of Morrison. 130 S.Ct. at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
25. Id. at 2884 (majority opinion) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).
26. Florey, supra note 7 at 1069-75. For example, vested-rights theory, propounded by Joseph
Story among others, identified the precise location where a cause of action accrued and called for courts
to apply the law of that territory.
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B. Canada
While there was some uncertainty whether Canada had the power to
enact extraterritorial legislation in the early years of the Dominion,27 all
doubt was removed in 1931. In that year, the Statute of Westminster
provided that “the Parliament of a Dominion has full power to make laws
having extra-territorial operation.”28 Relying on this pronouncement,
Canadian courts have affirmed the government’s power to legislate
extraterritorially,29 and on numerous occasions the Canadian Parliament
has chosen to include expressly extraterritorial provisions in Canadian
laws.30
Turning to statutory interpretation, Canada has a principle equivalent
to the United States’ Charming Betsy canon: “Parliament is not presumed
to legislate in breach of a treaty or in any manner inconsistent with the
comity of nations and the established rules of international law.”31
Canada’s rule of construction, like Charming Betsy, applies only when the
statute is ambiguous—Parliament has the power to violate international law
if it so indicates.32 Importantly for our purposes, Canadian courts have said
that this presumption incorporates the international law of legislative
27. See Symon Zucker, Extraterritoriality and Canadian Criminal Law, 17 CRIM. L. Q. 146, 148151 (collecting cases). See also Libman [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, ¶¶ 43-59 (Can.).
28. Statute of Westminster, Chapter 4 of the Statutes of the United Kingdom, 22 George V (Dec.
11, 1931), § 3. See Croft v. Dunphy, [1933] A.C. 156, 163(P.C.). (on appeal from the Supreme Court
of Canada). Note that this Section also eschews the special class of cases discussing whether the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to Canadian agents’ extraterritorial conduct. See,
e.g., Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 S.C.C. 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 (Can.); Khadr v. Canada
(Minister of Justice), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125, 2008 SCC 28 (Can.); R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, 2007
SCC 26, ¶ 66 (Can.); R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 (Can.); Keitner, supra note 4 (discussing these
issues with respect to the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom); Banda, supra note 4 at 53543 (discussing these issues and the war on terror).
29. E.g., Hape, 2 S.C.R., ¶ 66; Socy of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can.
Ass’n of Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 2004 SCC 45, ¶ 142-143 (Can.) (LeBel, J.)
[hereinafter “SOCAN”]; Libman, 2 S.C.R., 178. ¶ 44. See also Steve Coughlan, et al., Global Reach,
Local Grasp: Constructing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Age of Globalization 12-14 (June 23,
2006) (prepared for the Law Commission of Canada) [hereinafter “Law Commission”].
30. See Robert J. Currie & Stephen Coughlan, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Bigger
Picture or Smaller Frame?, 11 CAN. CRIM. L. R. 141 (2007) (cataloging Canadian extraterritorial
criminal statutes). As for the provinces, the Constitution Act limits their authority to matters “in each
province.” Constitution Act, (1867) 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), § 92. Laws must be connected to the
province in “pith and substance,” although incidental extraterritorial effects will be tolerated. See, e.g.,
B.C. v. Imperial Tobacco Can. Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, 2005 SCC 49(Can.); Law Commission, supra
note 29, at 13-14.
31. Daniels v. White, [1968] S.C.R. 517, 541 (Can.) (Pigeon, J.). See Hape, 2 S.C.R., ¶ 54
(quoting Daniels); SOCAN, 2 S.C.R., ¶ 142 (LeBel, J.) (citing Daniels); Cook, 2 S.C.R., ¶ 129
(Bastarache, J.) (quoting Daniels).
32. E.g., Hape, 2 S.C.R., ¶ 54; Cook, 2 S.C.R., ¶ 129 (Bastarache, J.); Daniels, [1968] S.C.R. at
541 (Pigeon, J.).
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jurisdiction.33
Separately, Canadian law also includes a presumption against
extraterritoriality: “While the Parliament of Canada . . . has the legislative
competence to enact laws having extraterritorial effect, it is presumed not
to intend to do so, in the absence of clear words or necessary implication to
the contrary.”34 Like its U.S. equivalent, the presumption recognizes the
power to legislate extraterritorially but requires expressed or implied intent
to do so. This common law presumption was also codified in the Canadian
Criminal Code.35 Continuing the parallel to U.S. law, the Canadian
Supreme Court has said that the presumption against extraterritoriality is
grounded in an assumption that legislatures are focused on domestic affairs
and in a concern for international comity.36
Turning to the meaning of extraterritoriality, the 1985 case Libman v.
The Queen may be seen as the Canadian equivalent of Morrison, although
they produced different conclusions.37 Libman was charged with a fraud
scheme in which calls were made from Canada to the United States,
convincing Americans to send money to Libman’s co-schemers in Costa
Rica in exchange for shares in a sham mining company. The court pithily
described the case as “both here and there.”38 The court concluded that
such here-and-there conduct should be treated as territorial only if there
was “a real and substantial link between an offence and this country.”39 The
presumption against extraterritoriality applies only if there is no such link.40
33. E.g., Hape, 2 S.C.R., ¶¶ 57-65; Cook, 2 S.C.R., ¶¶ 131-38 ( Bastarache, J.).
34. SOCAN, 2 S.C.R., ¶ 54. See also, id., ¶ 144; ( LeBel, J.); Libman, 2 S.C.R.,¶¶ 43-77; Zucker,
supra note 27, at 151-56 (collecting cases); Law Commission, supra note 28.
35. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 6(2) (Can) (“Subject to this Act or any other Act of Parliament, no
person shall be convicted or discharged . . . of an offence committed outside Canada.”). Parliament
may overcome this codified presumption as well. See, e.g., R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (Can.)
(discussing war crimes and crimes against humanity); R. v. Klassen, 2008 B.C.S.C. 1762 (Can.)
(discussing sex tourism).
36. E.g., Libman, 2 S.C.R., ¶ 65; Cook, 2 S.C.R., ¶ 133 (Bastarache, J.).
37. Libman, 2 S.C.R. See also., Currie & Coughlan, supra note 30, at 151-52 (discussing
Libman). For a discussion of the doctrinal confusion before Libman, see Zucker, supra note 27, at 170.
38. Libman, 2 S.C.R., ¶ 63.
39. Id., ¶(internal quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., Law Commission, supra note 28, at 40
(“This is the essence of Libman—defining the scope of the territoriality principle.”). Libman’s “real
and substantial connection” test was not new to Canadian law. See Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De
Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1090-91 (Can.) (noting that the rule has its roots in an English decision
on divorce law, Indyka v. Indyka, [1969] 1 A.C. 33 (U.K.)). Prior decisions had applied this rule to
decide whether to recognize or enforce foreign judgments, e.g., Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416,
2003 SCC 72 (Can.) (foreign-state judgments); Morguard, 3 S.C.R. 1077 (foreign-province judgments);
to determine the situs of a tort, e.g., Moran v. Pyle Nat’l (Can.) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393; and to
address personal jurisdiction and choice-of-laws issues, e.g., Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] 71 O.R. 3d 675, ¶¶
23-38 (Can.); Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 (Can.).
40. Professor Currie refers to Libman as a test of “qualified territoriality,” although this Article
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Since Libman, scholars and courts alike have acknowledged that the
“real and substantial connection” test is the threshold inquiry in
determining whether the presumption against extraterritoriality may be
avoided in criminal and civil cases.41 Notably, this test calls upon courts to
assess the overall factual circumstances of the case and determine whether
those facts sufficiently engage the Canadian legal system—it does not
require courts to focus on the statute in question. In this way, Canada offers
a different threshold for extraterritoriality than the United States, although
both apply the same presumptions once a case is determined to be
extraterritorial. This Part explains this distinction in greater detail in
Section D, but first, Australia.
C. Australia
Australian judges have faced many of these same questions. Although
the background rules appear similar, upon closer inspection there seems to
be ambiguity in the Australian approach not present in the American or
Canadian approaches.
The Australian Constitution provides that Parliament may “make laws
for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with
respect to . . . external affairs.”42 It is this clause that gives Parliament the
power to legislate extraterritorially—subject to the “peace, order, and good
government” limitation, which is no limit at all.43 The High Court of
Australia has interpreted the external-affairs power broadly, including not
only all matters geographically external to Australia but also seemingly all
internal matters that are, in some way, subject to international concern.44
does not use that term in this context. ROBERT J. CURRIE, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW (201) 409-24.
41. E.g., SOCAN, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427,¶ 60 (restating the rule in a civil case and collecting
cases); [LR]; id, at. p¶ 144 (perLeBel, J.); Klassen, 2008 B.C.S.C.at ¶ 71; Currie & Coughlan, supra
note 30, at 151-52; Law Commission, supra note 29, at 40-46; Benjamin Perrin, Taking a Vacation
from the Law? Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction and Section 7(4.1) of the Criminal Code, 13 CAN.
CRIM. L. R. 175, 194-97 (2009). The court in Libman suggested that the real-and-substantial-interest
test may be “coterminous with the requirements of international comity,” and on this basis the Ontario
Court of Appeals used international-comity principles to define the reach of a probation order. R. v.
Greco (2001), 159 C.C.C. 3d 146 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
42. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51(xxix).
43. E.g., R v Foster; Ex parte E. & Austrl. S.S. Co. (1959) 103 CLR 256, ¶ 4 (Austl.) (Windeyer,
J.) (deferring to Parliament’s assessment of this requirement); Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991)
172 CLR 501, ¶ 16 (Austl.) (commenting that Foster’s deference “applies with particular force to an
exercise of the external affairs power”).
44. See Donald R. Rothwell, International Law and Legislative Power, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM 104, 105 (Brian Opeskin & Donald Rothwell, eds., 1997) (categorizing
external-affairs decisions as approving Parliament’s authority to make laws with respect to matters: (a)
“geographically external to Australia”; (b) “implementing an international treaty”; (c) “subject [to]
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The Statute of Westminster, as applied to Australia, confirms this
authority.45
Turning to statutory interpretation, the landscape of the Australian
rules is less clear than its American or Canadian counterparts. Three canons
are relevant here. First, Australia has a Charming Betsy equivalent:
Australian courts presume that statutes do not violate international law,46
although they recognize that the government has the power to do so.47
Second, Australia has a presumption against extraterritoriality,48 which may
be overcome by express or implied legislative intent.49 In addition to this
international concern”; (d) “generally regulated and subject to international law under either customary
international law or under general principles of international law”; and (e) “that ha[ve] been the subject
of recommendations by international bodies, agencies or organisations”). See also Polyukhovich, 172
CLR 501; Vict. v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 (Austl.); Horta v Commonwealth (1994) 181
CLR 183 (Austl.); Commonwealth v Tas. (1983) 158 CLR 1 (Austl.); N.S.W. v Commonwealth (1975)
135 CLR 337 (Austl.); Joanna Kyriakakis, Australian Prosecution of Corporations for International
Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 809, 819 (2007); Perrin, supra note 41, at 204.
45. Statute of Westminster, Chapter 4 of the Statutes of the United Kingdom, 22 George V (Dec.
11, 1931), § 3. The Australian states also may legislate extraterritorially. Australia Act, 1986, c. 2, §
2(1) (Austl.). See, e.g., Rothwell, supra note 44, at 105-06. Courts have required a real connection
between the law and the state, although courts have construed this requirement liberally, settling for
even a “remote or general” connection. E.g, Mobil Oil Austrl. Pty Ltd v Vict. (2002) 211 CLR 1, ¶ 9
(Austl.); Union S.S. Co. of Austrl. Pty v King 166 CLR 1, ¶¶ 22-24 (Austl.); Pearce v Florenca (1976)
135 CLR 507, ¶ 6 (Austl.); Bengtell v Goliath Portland Cement Co. (1994) 10 NSWCCR 60 (Austl.).
46. E.g., Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, ¶ 27 (Austl.);
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Gov’t & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, ¶ 41
(Austl.); Polites v Commonwealth 70 CLR 60 (Austl.); id. ( Rich, J.); DENNIS CHARLES PEARCE &
ROBERT STANLEY GEDDES, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN AUSTRALIA § 5.14, at 140-41, (5th ed.
2001); Sir Anthony Mason, International Law as a Source of Domestic Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM 210, 220-22 (Brian Opeskin & Donald Rothwell, eds., 1997).
47. E.g., Lipohar v. R [1999] HCA 65; (1999)200 CLR., 485 ¶¶ 94-95 (Austl.) (Gaudron,
Gummow & Hayne, JJ.); Horta, 181 CLR at ¶ 10.
48. Morgan v White (1912) 15 CLR 1 (Austl.) ( Barton, J.) (“The governing principle is that all
legislation is primâ facie territorial . . . .”); id. ( Isaac, J.) (“[U]nless the language of a Statute by express
words or necessary implication indicates the contrary, the persons, property, and events in respect of
which Parliament has legislated are presumed to be limited to those in the territory over which it has
jurisdiction and for the welfare of which it exercises that jurisdiction.”). See, e.g., Lipohar, 200 CLR,
¶¶ 15-16 ( Gleeson, C.J.); Welker v Hewett 120 CLR 503 (Austl.); Meyer Heine Pty v China Navigation
Co. (1966) 115 CLR 10, ¶ 3 (Austl.) ( Kitto, J.); id., at ¶ 6 ( Taylor, J.); id. ( Windeyer, J.); Koop v Bebb
(1951), 84 CLR 629, ¶ 3 (Austl.) ( McTiernan, J.) (citing American Banana); PEARCE & GEDDES, supra
note 46, § 5.3, at 133,; Stuart Dutson, The Conflict of Laws and Statutes: The International Operation
of Legislation Dealing with Matters of Civil Law in the United Kingdom and Australia, 60 MOD. L.
REV. 668, 674-76 (1997).
49. E.g., Meyer Heine, 115 CLR, ¶ 7 ( Taylor, J.) (looking for a “clear indication” of legislative
intent); id, at ¶ 3 ( Menzies, J.) (same); id. ( Windeyer, J.) (looking for “some clear and express
indication”); PEARCE & GEDDES, supra note 46, § 5.7, at 136-37, § 6.36 at 175-76,; Dutson, supra note
48, at 675 (describing the requirement of “express words” or “‘necessary implication’ in cases where
the policy, object or purpose of the statute so requires.”); id. at 675-76 nn. 44-46 & 53 (collecting
cases). Mr. Dutson’s otherwise excellent article on extraterritoriality in Australian law suggests that
Australian courts apply a presumption against extraterritoriality and a “purposive method” as separate
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common law version of the rule, Parliament and numerous state legislatures
have codified the presumption against extraterritoriality in interpretation
acts.50 Third, Australian courts have also adopted a presumption that
statutes do not extend to cases governed by foreign law.51 Some scholars
have articulated this rule as a stand-alone presumption,52 while at least one
leading treatise has characterized it as merely a “specific application” of the
presumption against extraterritoriality.53
Australian law, therefore, includes an international law presumption, a
territorial presumption, and a foreign law presumption. A review of
Australian jurisprudence and scholarship reveals some blurring among
these presumptions. Whether the foreign law presumption is an
independent rule is just one example.54 Courts also have blurred the lines
between the international law presumption and the presumption against
extraterritoriality.55 Furthermore, the High Court has a propensity to refer
to an assumption that a legislature legislates within the scope of its
jurisdiction—without specifying whether it is referring to territorial
jurisdiction, international prescriptive jurisdiction, or the internal divisions
of authority within the country.56 Interestingly, while the American and
rules. Id. at 676-77. However, it seems that the latter is merely another way to describe a court
overcoming the presumption—legislative intent sufficient to overcome the presumption may be inferred
from the legislature’s purpose in enacting the statute. Mr. Dutson’s other remarks on the confusion in
Australian law, however, are well taken.
50. See, e.g., Acts Interpretation Act 1901, s 21(1) (Austl.); PEARCE & GEDDES, supra note 46, §
6.36, at 175-76, (collecting statutes for Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, Queensland,
Tasmania, and Victoria). See Lipohar, 200 CLR, ¶ 20 (Gleeson, C.J.) (discussing the statutory
presumption in South Australian criminal law); Wanganui-Rangitikei Elec. Power Bd. v Austrl. Mut.
Provident Soc’y (1934) 50 CLR 581 (Austl.) (interpreting New South Wales law). See also infra
Section IV.A (discussing interpretation acts). Although there has been no explicit statement on point, it
appears that these acts do not alter the strength or breadth of the presumption. See, e.g., PEARCE &
GEDDES, supra note 46, § 5.4 at 134, & § 6.36, at 176, ; Grannall v C. Geo. Kellaway & Sons Pty
[1955] HCA 5; (1955) 93 CLR 36, ¶ 16 (Austl.) (noting that the statute “reinforced” the common law
presumption); Vicars v Comm’r of Stamp Duties (N.S.W.) (1945) 71 CLR 309 (Austl.) ( Williams, J.)
(noting that the statute “appear[s] to be intended to give statutory effect to the rule of construction”).
But see Wanganui-Rangitikei, 50 CLR ( Dixon, J.) (suggesting that the North South Wales Act is
narrower than the common law presumption).
51. See, e.g., Akai Pty v People’s Ins. Co. (1996) 188 CLR 418 (Austl.) (Touhy, J.).
52. E.g., Graeme Hill, Resolving a True Conflict between State Laws: A Minimalist Approach, 29
MELB. U. L.R. 39, 42-43 (2005); Dutson, supra note 48, at 674-76.
53. PEARCE & GEDDES, supra note 46, § 5.6, at 135-36.
54. See Dutson, supra note 48, at 682-85 (collecting cases).
55. See, e.g., XYZ v Commonwealth (2006) 227 ALR 495, ¶ 5 (Austl.) (relying on Meyer Heine);
Meyer Heine Pty v China Navigation Co. 115 CLR 10, ¶ 6 (Austl.) ¶(Taylor, J.) (blurring the
extraterritorial presumption and the international-law presumption). But see Geoffrey Lindell, Judicial
Review of International Affairs, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM 160, 179-80
(Brian Opeskin & Donald Rothwell, eds., 1997) (confirming separate presumptions).
56. See, e.g., R v Foster; Ex parte E. & Austrl. S.S. Co. 103 C.L.R., ¶ 13; Barcelo v Electrolytic
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Canadian courts justify the presumption against extraterritoriality by
looking to international comity and the domestic focus of the legislature,
the Australia courts exclusively justify the presumption on the ground of
respect for international comity.57 This difference may explain some of the
blurring, as it makes it more difficult to differentiate the presumption
against extraterritoriality from the other canons that also arise out of a
concern for international comity.
The most obvious area lacking clarity, however, is the meaning of
territoriality—it appears that Australia has yet to have its Morrison or
Libman moment.58 One recent article, for example, identified five separate
territorial-connection rules in Australian jurisprudence.59 The closest to a
Morrison or Libman decision was Lipohar in 1999, but that decision did
more to muddy the waters than clarify the law. Lipohar addressed an
interstate criminal conspiracy law. Although “interstate,” “criminal,” and
“conspiracy” bring with them specific issues, the confusion with respect to
territoriality in this case is generalizable. Six justices issued four separate
opinions, and managed in those pages to offer an even larger number of
theories of territoriality. Chief Justice Gleeson would apply the law only
where a “real connection” to the state existed.60 Justices Gaudron,
Gummow, and Hayne dodged the thornier theoretical issue because they
found that steps in furtherance of the conspiracy had occurred in the forum
state.61 Justice Callinan looked for a “real link.”62 And Justice Kirby
criticized “the unsatisfactory state of legal authority” and articulated five
different, reasonable proposals—(i) adopting a strict requirement of
Zinc Co. of Australasia Ltd (1932) 48 CLR 391 (Austl.) (Dixon, J.). . In addition, although the seminal
decision in Polites v Commonwealth articulated the Charming Betsy-like rule with respect to issues of
legislative jurisdiction, 70 CLR 60 (Austl.) (Dixon, J.), cases relying on it tend to address other
international-law issues, e.g. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
(discussing the Convention on the Rights of the Child); Horta v. Commonwealth (1994) 181 CLR 183
(Austl.) (discussing customary international law and various international instruments). This leaves a
gap in our understanding of what (and how) prescriptive-jurisdictional limits may apply to
extraterritorial cases in Australian courts.
57. See, e.g., Lipohar v. R (1999) 200 CLR., 485, ¶¶ 94-95 (Austl.) ¶¶(Gaudron, Gummow &
Hayne, JJ.) (concluding that international comity was the “only relevant reason” to adopt the
presumption against extraterritoriality); Morgan v White (1912) 15 CLR 1 (Austl.) (Barton, J.) (“This
rule rests on the presumption that the legislature did not intend to give its enactment an effect which
would be inconsistent with international law or with the comity of nations.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); PEARCE & GEDDES, supra note 46, § 5.3, at 133.
58. E.g., Dutson, supra note 48, at 675-76; Mynott v Barnard (1939) 62 CLR 68 (Austl.)
(debating various definitions of territoriality).
59. Belinda Wells & Michael Burnett, When Cultures Collide: An Australian Citizen’s Power to
Demand the Death Penalty Under Islamic Law, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 26-27 (2000).
60. Lipohar, 200 CLR ¶ 38 (Gleeson, C.J.).
61. Id. ¶¶ 112-13 (Gaudron, Gummow & Hayne, JJ.).
62. Id. ¶¶ 269-73 (Callinan, J.).
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locality; (ii) treating conspiracy as an exception; (iii) looking to the location
of the victim; (iv) citing common law as a basis of jurisdiction across all
states; and (v) adopting Libman’s “real and substantial connection” test—
before advocating a strict territoriality rule.63 In short, the meaning of
territoriality is still an open question in Australian law, and therefore the
question of how to avoid the presumption against extraterritoriality is open
as well.
D. Comparative Extraterritoriality
The preceding three sections reviewed the American, Canadian, and
Australian approaches to extraterritoriality. Before turning to indigenouspeoples law, it is helpful to pause briefly and consider some lessons from
this three-part study. This Section, therefore, asks a traditional comparative
law question: what can we learn from the way three different countries
approach a single issue?
In a meaningful way, American, Canadian, and Australian courts take
a very similar approach to extraterritoriality. They all recognize that their
legislatures may pass laws that apply abroad, but they enforce a
presumption against extraterritoriality for ambiguous statutes and their
statutory canons reflect (in some way) international rules of legislative
jurisdiction. These similarities should not be understated.
That said, there is a notable difference in the way that these states
define “territoriality”—or, in other words, when their courts choose to
apply or avoid the presumption. As noted above, Australian courts have not
resolved the territoriality question, so the analysis of this issue focuses on
the American (Morrison) and Canadian (Libman) approaches.
Seeking to avoid the presumption turning into “a craven watchdog”
when faced with any domestic hook, American and Canadian courts have
announced rules requiring more: Morrison requires a connection within the
focus of the statute while Libman requires a connection to Canada that is
real and substantial. These rules are not coextensive, and the difference
between them was not an accident. In reaching its conclusion in Libman,
the Canadian court considered and rejected the gist-of-the-offense
approach,64 which bears a striking resemblance to Morrison’s focus test.
Meanwhile, the real-and-substantial-link test is not unlike the conduct-andeffects test, which Morrison expressly rejected.65

63. Id. ¶¶ 133-36,173-200 (Kirby, J.).
64. Libman v. The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 (Can.) [¶¶ 43-64. See id. at 208. (suggesting that
rules of this type rest on an “unreality”).
65. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct 2869, 2884-86 (2010).
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Although only time will tell how courts deploy these standards, some
preliminary comments may be made with respect to the connection
between these rules and the bases for the presumption. As described above,
the presumption against extraterritoriality has been expressly justified on
the basis of legislative attention and conflicts with foreign law. In addition,
although not a stated justification for the presumption, some scholars have
observed that due process interests are central considerations for questions
of extraterritoriality.66
With these interests in mind, we can begin to assess the Morrison and
Libman rules. One canonical justification of the presumption is legislative
attention. Although some have questioned whether legislative attention is a
proper justification at all,67 it is hard to deny the importance of legislative
intent in statutory interpretation. Perhaps the differences in the American
and Canadian courts’ understanding of legislation explain the divergent
approaches in Morrison and Libman. The “focus” rule suggests that when a
body legislates, its attention is on the particular subject at hand. Therefore,
domestic attention is linked to the subject matter of the legislation.68 The
“real-and-substantial interest” test, on the other hand, implies that the
legislature is concerned with all things that could affect the state whether or
not any particular element occurs within its territorial borders. Under this
view, courts should care about the overall connection between the conduct
and the state. Further comparative research could assess whether American
and Canadian courts take similar views of legislative intent in other areas
of law that touch on foreign affairs.
The second canonical justification is sovereignty, represented here by
courts’ concern about conflicts with foreign laws.69 On this score, neither
66. See supra note 6. See also supra note 7 (citing Florey-Rosen debate, which addresses, among
others, the due-process and sovereign interests related to state extraterritoriality).
67. E.g., R v Foster; Ex parte E. & Austrl. S.S. Co. [1959] HCA 10; (1959) 103 CLR 256, ¶ 12
(Austl.) ¶( Menzies, J.) (“It is my view that . . . the question must always be one of the construction of a
grant of power without any presumption that because there are no express words conferring extraterritorial power there is no such power.”); Dutson, supra note 48, at 683; Born, supra note 13, at 7475.
68. For divergent views on Morrison’s approximation of legislative intent, compare Lea
Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy,
and the Presumption against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655 (2011)
(criticizing the focus rule) and John H. Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 40 SW. L. REV. 635 (2001) (same) with William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test,
40 SW. L. REV. 687 (2011) (praising the focus rule)..
69. This justification tracks the notion of sovereign equality among states, which represents a
fundamental principle of international law and foreign relations. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1
(“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”); The
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) (referring to the “full and absolute
territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign” and the “perfect equality and
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the Morrison nor the Libman rule is particularly well-attuned to the
sovereignty of other states. These rules do not take into account the
existence or degree of conflict with foreign law,70 nor do they weigh the
strength of a foreign state’s connection to the case71 or permit any
deference to the views of foreign states or the diplomatic branches of their
own governments.72 Indeed, as suggested in the preceding paragraph, these
rules may be proxies for domestic sovereign interests rather than foreign
ones. That said, it is not impossible to comment on foreign sovereign
interests. If we measure avoidance of foreign law conflicts and respect for
foreign sovereignty by the number of cases excluded from domestic courts,
then it appears that Morrison will win out. One likely reading of the
decisions treats the Morrison rule as a subset of the Libman rule—certainly
a state could have a real and substantial interest even if the focus is
extraterritorial; but if the focus of a statute is territorial, then courts
presumably would find that the state has a real and substantial interest as
well. So, on this crude measure, Morrison better insulates foreign state
interests by excluding more extraterritorial cases from the sweep of
domestic law. This is not to say, however, that either Morrison or Libman
tracks foreign interests particularly well.
The last interest is due process. Due process in the context of
extraterritoriality comes down to notice. Although neither American nor
Canadian courts expressly invoke due process in this connection, a
presumption of extraterritoriality tracks this norm by protecting defendants
from the application of laws of which they have no notice. If the measure
of due process protection is the number of defendants excluded from a
law’s reach, then, for the same reasons mentioned with respect to
sovereignty, Morrison will make a better shield.73 However, if we ask
which rule better approximates our due process instincts, a different picture

absolute independence of sovereigns”).
Notably, Justice Blackmun observed that this concern for conflict with foreign law, at least in one case,
led to a conflict with international law. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 207 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the application of the Immigration and Nationality Act to Haitian
refugees interdicted by the United States).
70. Cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (stating that the court
would dismiss a case if there was a “true conflict” between U.S. and foreign law).
71. Cf. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 1976) (calling for
courts to assess strengths of U.S. and foreign interests).
72. Cf. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2291 (2010) (conceding that the State Department
has a role in foreign-official immunity cases even after the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
73. In addition, in these circumstances, the international-law canon and notions of international
comity may provide a backstop for unreasonable assertions of jurisdiction by the courts. How
rigorously courts in the United States and Canada enforce these rules also will require further
evaluation.
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develops. One could create a convincing due process account of Libman—
as particular conduct develops a stronger connection to a state, a potential
defendant should expect an increased likelihood that her behavior would be
subject to that state’s laws. The Morrison rule lacks this correlation.
Whether or not a defendant’s connection to the United States falls within
the focus of the statute says nothing of whether a defendant would imagine
that she is subject to U.S. law.74 Of course, this analysis is limited to cases
where the law is ambiguous about its geographic scope, but those are the
only laws whose reach courts could reasonably limit by applying canons of
construction (as opposed to, for example, constitutional notions of due
process). This Article will return to the interests that underpin
extraterritoriality regimes in Part III’s comparison of foreign- and nativeaffairs law.
Turning away from Morrison and Libman, distinctions between
extraterritoriality in criminal and civil cases also merit attention. In
criminal cases, lower federal courts in the United States seem to be more
willing to “overcome” the presumption—thereby allowing the government
to apply a criminal statute abroad—than they are in civil cases brought by
private litigants.75 On the other hand, in Australia there is some suggestion
that the presumption may be stricter in criminal cases.76 The twin interests
of sovereignty and due process provide different assessments of these
outcomes. If one is most concerned with a respect for foreign sovereignty,
then a more permissive rule in criminal cases may be preferred because
those cases are brought by the branch of government explicitly charged
with foreign affairs; civil cases are brought by private parties, who
presumably have less concern for international comity.77 Alternatively, the
due process concern is more acute when liberty interests are at stake as they
are in criminal cases. On this view, courts should be more cautious when
extending those laws extraterritorially.78
74. On the related topic of personal jurisdiction, U.S. courts permit tag service when a defendant
has no connection to the jurisdiction except merely passing through it, e.g. Burnham v. Superior Court
of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990), leading to the (in)famous case of personal service on an airplane flying
through the airspace of the forum state. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
75. See Clopton, supra note 16, at 160–72 (collecting and categorizing cases). The criminal cases
generally rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97–98 (1922),
and look to the nature of the offense, the statute’s purpose, or policy considerations.
76. See PEARCE & GEDDES, supra note 46,§ 9.16; Dutson, supra note 48, at 668.
77. See Clopton, supra note 16, at 181–83 (discussing how courts could use the justifications of
the presumption to support a more lenient reading in criminal cases). Indeed, this consideration seemed
to have convinced Justice Stevens to consider different rules depending on whether the government
brought the case. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2894 n.12 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
78. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 383 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
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Finally, turning to a more practical issue, this Part also highlights the
different avenues by which the presumption can be introduced. Recall that
the Canadian Criminal Code and various Australian interpretation acts
codified the common law presumption against extraterritoriality. Not only
may such a legislative approach clarify murky areas of law, it also puts the
onus on the political branches to define the rules of the road. Particularly
for a topic like statutory interpretation, which is by definition a search for
the intent of the legislature, it makes sense for the legislature to announce
the terms.79 The United States has no statutory extraterritoriality rules;
Canada has only codified the presumption for criminal cases; and none of
the countries surveyed have defined territoriality in a statute—i.e.,
answering the Morrison and Libman question. This idea is also taken up in
more detail below, after a survey of the three states’ approaches to the
analogous question of extranationality.
II. EXTRANATIONALITY
As described in the Introduction, extranationality is the analog to
extraterritoriality for indiginous peoples: the extent to which a country’s
laws apply to native peoples and territory. Beyond the facial analogy
between two areas of transborder law, the reasons to think about the
connection between international legal issues and native-peoples law run
deep.
To begin with, indigenous peoples law in the Western world has its
roots in international law. In the United States, relations with the Indian
tribes during the colonial and early republican periods “were largely treated
as matters of foreign relations.”80 Chief Justice Marshall’s famous trilogy
of Indian law opinions reflected international law roots,81 though he

(applying the rule of lenity to reject the application of the wire fraud statute to frauds against foreign
governments).
79. A related concern with legislative clarity is the manner in which states express extraterritorial
intent in individual laws. For example, the extraterritorial provision in the old Canadian war crimes law
was written in a manner that permitted conflicting interpretations. See R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701
(Can.) (discussing Canadian Criminal Code § 7(3.71)). The Canadian Parliament adopted clearer
language when it updated its laws to conform to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
See Crimes Against Humanity & War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24, §§ 6, 8.
80. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 30 (2002). For
Professor Cleveland’s able summary of U.S. Indian law and its connection to international law, see id.
at 25–81.
81. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8. Wheat.) 543 (1823) (applying the law of nations to
determine the rights of the United States); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)
(discussing Cherokee sovereignty in the context of international sovereignty); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (discussing treaty rights in light of international law).
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stopped short of recognizing the tribes as the equivalent of sovereign states.
Instead, Marshall concluded that the tribes were “domestic dependent
nations,” or “wards” with the United States as their “guardian.”82 In any
event, during its first century, the United States conducted business with
the Indian tribes through treaties and, as Professor Wiessner has shown,
applied to those treaties the same requirements and courtesies that were
applied to international treaties.83 Canada also engaged in significant treaty
making with its native peoples,84 and international law was central to
Australian conceptions of early interactions with aboriginals.85
The concept of “plenary” or “inherent” powers further links foreign
affairs to Indian law. Although these terms have taken on multiple
meanings, I use them here to identify the area of national authority derived
from the United States’ status as a sovereign nation.86 The U.S. Supreme
Court has applied the plenary powers doctrine to immigration, overseas
territories, foreign affairs, and Indian law.87 With respect to Indian law,
courts seeking constitutional roots for the plenary power have looked, at
various times, to the Indian Commerce Clause, war-making power, and

82. E.g., Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16–17 (1831) (“The condition of the Indians in relation to
the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence. In the general, nations not
owing a common allegiance are foreign to each other. The term foreign nation is, with strict propriety,
applicable by either to the other. But the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by
peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else. The Indian territory is admitted to compose
a part of the United States. In all our maps, geographical treatises, histories, and laws, it is so
considered. In all our intercourse with foreign nations, in our commercial regulations, in any attempt at
intercourse between Indians and foreign nations, they are considered as within the jurisdictional limits
of the United States, subject to many of those restraints which are imposed upon our own citizens. . . .
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to
the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government;
yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of
the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly,
perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. . . . Their relation to the United States resembles
that of a ward to his guardian.”).
83. Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 567, 569–80 (1995). The United States stopped signing treaties with Indian tribes in 1971. See
25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006); George William Rice, Indian Rights, 25 U.S.C. § 71: The End of Indian
Sovereignty or a Self-Limitation of Contractual Ability?, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239 (1977).
84. See, e.g., Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global
Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 66–70 (1999). But see R. v.
Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, 1038 (Can.) (“[A]n Indian treaty is an agreement sui generis, which is
neither created nor terminated according to the rules of international law.”).
85. E.g., Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.). However, unlike in the
United States and Canada, no aboriginal treaties were signed in Australia. See infra Section II.C.
86. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 80, at 7–10.
87. See, e.g., id.; Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 37
(1996) (“[P]lenary power in federal Indian law, like that in immigration law, arose from conceptions of
the inherent sovereignty of nations under international law.”).
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treaty power—all of which evoke foreign relations.88 Professor Frickey
perceptively associated the plenary powers connection not only with its
sources of authority but also with the characterization of native peoples as
“foreigners.”89
Recalling these international law roots, modern activists have turned
to international law to protect native interests and redress native grievances.
In particular, international human rights law has become an important tool
among scholars and practitioners of Indian law.90 Native rights advocates
have tried to use international law in both domestic and international
tribunals to promote native peoples’ rights.91
In sum, in the words of the father of American federal Indian law,
Felix Cohen: “[W]e must recognize that our Indian law originated, and can
still be most clearly grasped, as a branch of international law.”92 Yet,
scholars have not taken full advantage of the connections between these
fields in attempting to address specific, overlapping questions that arise in

88. See, e.g., Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over the “Other”: Indians,
Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law,
20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 441–43 (2002).
89. Frickey, supra note 87. Despite the criticism, Professor Frickey also acknowledges that this
connection is not all bad: “The most protective aspects of federal Indian law have thus viewed Indians
as having group rights—indeed, group sovereignty.” Id. at 48.
90. See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT,
INDIAN RIGHTS AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 161–96 (2005); S. JAMES ANAYA,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2004); Nigel Bankes, International Human
Rights Law and Natural Resources Projects within the Traditional Territories of Indigenous Peoples,
47 ALTA. L. REV. 457 (2010); John D. Smelcer, Using International Law More Effectively to Secure
and Advance Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Towards Enforcement in U.S. and Australian Domestic
Courts, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 301 (2006); Jonathan P. Vuotto, Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua:
International Precedent for Indigenous Land Rights?, 22 B.U. INT’L L. J. 219 (2004); International Law
as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1751 (2003); Wiessner, Rights and
Status of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 84; Frickey, supra note 87; Russell Lawrence Barsh,
Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law?, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
33 (1994); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Frontier of Legal Thought III: Encounters on the Frontiers of
International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World,
1990 DUKE L.J. 660. But see Walter K. Olson, Maimon Schwarzschild & Carlos T. Bea, Panel
Discussion: International Law and Indian Law, Federalist Society: Third Annual Western Conference
(Jan. 24, 2009), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubid.1258/pub_detail.asp (lamenting this
development).
91. Indeed, some instruments are specifically addressed to indigenous rights. E.g., American
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Annual Report of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights 1995, OEA/Ser.L./V./II.91, doc. 7, (1996; Draft United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E.S.C. Res. 1994/45, U.N. ESCOR, 46th
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994); Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991).
92. Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEO.
L. J. 1, 17 (1942).
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both the international and native peoples contexts.93 The paucity of
scholarship on this connection is one motivating factor for this project.
With this background in mind, this Part considers the indigenous
peoples analogy to extraterritoriality across three states.94 As described
below, the United States and Canada have bodies of law that address this
“extranationality” question.95 Both states’ courts have adopted something
akin to a presumption in favor of the application of domestic law to native
peoples and their territory. But the story is far more complex than this pithy
mantra, and these complexities reveal insights on comparative questions
and offer recommendations to policymakers interested in either
international or indigenous issues.96
A. United States
We begin our analysis of extranationality with the United States.
Given Congress’ plenary power in this field, there is no question that it has
legislative jurisdiction over the tribes if it chooses to exercise it.97 In this
way, the comparison to extraterritoriality is a match.
With respect to the interpretation of ambiguous statutes, the Supreme
Court used a presumption against extranationality in Elk v. Wilkins,
remarking that “[g]eneral acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, unless
93. In this light, Professor Cleveland recently remarked: “Until recently, scholars had generally
overlooked the interrelationship between the doctrines of sovereignty relating to Indians, aliens, and
territories, and had failed to systematically connect these separate doctrinal areas to modern foreign
relations jurisprudence.” Cleveland, supra note 80, at 13.
94. Interestingly, in Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall expressly connects Indian law
to extraterritoriality, referring to the principle that “[t]he extra-territorial power of every legislature
being limited in its action to its own citizens or subjects, the very passage of this act is an assertion of
jurisdiction over the Cherokee nation, and of the rights and powers consequent on jurisdiction.” 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542 (1832).
95. For reasons described in more detail below, Australia’s approach is less useful in this
comparison and therefore it is discussed only briefly. See infra Part II.C.
96. For other examples of related comparative indigenous-peoples law, see A. Dan Tarlock,
Tribal Justice and Property Rights: The Evolution of Winters v. United States, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J.
471 (2010) (comparing U.S. and Australian approaches to aboriginal land rights) [hereinafter “Tarlock,
Tribal Justice”]; Peter Manus, Indigenous Peoples’ Environmental Rights: Evolving Common Law
Perspectives in Canada, Australia, and the United States, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 13-17, 26-31
(2006) (comparing Canadian, Australian, and American approaches to national regulation and
environmental rights); Edo Banach, The Roma and the Native Americans: Encapsulated Communities
within Larger Constitutional Regimes, 14 FLA. J. INT’L L. 353 (2002) (comparing U.S. Indian law and
Roma rights in the European Union); A. Dan Tarlock, Australian and United States Law of Aboriginal
Land Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 1 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1998) [hereinafter “Tarlock, A
Comparative Perspective”]; Bradford W. Morse, Indigenous Renascence: Law, Culture & Society in the
21st Century: Common Roots but Modern Divergences: Aboriginal Policies in Canada and the United
States, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 115 (1997). None of these draw specific connections to analogous
international-law questions.
97. See supra notes 86–89.
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so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them”98—a
presumption against extranationality. However, the modern view of
statutory interpretation takes a nearly opposite approach.
In Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, the
Supreme Court articulated a presumption in favor of extranationality.99 The
tribe challenged New York’s taking of land for a power plant, but the court
concluded that the Federal Power Act authorized the taking.100 The Court
went further: “it is now well settled by many decisions of the Court that a
general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their
property interests.”101 In dissent, Justice Black argued that the Court’s
decision violated the terms of the Act and ran afoul of both Indian treaties
and the policy of preserving reservations for tribal use.102 Justice Black
closed with an oft-quoted jab at the majority: “Great nations, like great
men, should keep their word.”103
Although courts have been wont to invoke Justice Black’s rebuke,104 it
was Tuscarora’s dictum on statutes of general applicability that has had the
more profound effect on U.S. law. Without further direct guidance from the
Supreme Court, the courts of appeals have run with Tuscarora as a
presumption of general applicability, tempered by exceptions derived from
other Indian law precedents. Most prominently, the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Coeur d’Alene reconciled Tuscarora’s default presumption in favor of
extranationality with other Indian law decisions to articulate a new rule:
98. 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884).
99. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
100. Id. at 111–15.
101. Id. at 116 (referencing inter alia Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner,
295 U.S. 418 (1935) and Okla. Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943)). With regard to
state law, the Supreme Court has said that state laws typically do not apply on reservations absent
express Congressional language to the contrary. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480
U.S. 202, 207 (1987). See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 154 (1980) (“[T]ribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal
Government, not the States.”). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) (providing for state criminal
jurisdiction for certain territories in certain states); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006) (same for civil actions to
which Indians are parties); Vanessa J. Jimenez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State
Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 1627 (1998). However, the Court also
announced an exception for “pure regulations,” allowing states to regulate conduct without generating
revenue even in the face of an Indian treaty. See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 391
U.S. 392, 398–401 (1968); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 683–85 (1942); United States v.
Smiskin, 487 F.3d 1260, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 2007). These cases address the prescriptive-jurisdiction
issue, not questions of statutory interpretation.
102. Fed. Power Comm’n, 362 U.S. at 124–42 (Black, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 142 (Black, J., dissenting).
104. E.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 422 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); CIA v. Sims, 471
U.S. 159, 175 n.20 (1985); United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 887 (8th Cir. 2002); American
Cetacean Soc’y v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting).
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laws of general applicability apply to tribes unless “(1) the law touches
exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters; (2) the
application of the law to the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by
Indian treaties; or (3) there is proof by legislative history or some other
means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to Indians on their
reservations . . . .”105 Many courts of appeals have adopted this formulation
and applied it to civil and criminal cases involving native peoples.106
To review, Congress has the power to legislate extranationally. But if
it does not specify whether a particular statute applies to native peoples,
Tuscarora/Coeur d’Alene not only apply a presumption in favor of
extranationality, but also formalize exceptions that recognize tribal
sovereignty,107 pre-existing treaty rights,108 and indicia of congressional

105. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (modification in original).
106. E.g., Menominee Tribal Enters. v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669, 671–74 (7th Cir. 2010) (Occupational
Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”)); Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425, 429–38 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)); United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2007)
(criminal); Taylor v. Ala. Intertribal Council Title IV J.T.P.A., 261 F.3d 1032, 1034–37 (11th Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (42 U.S.C. § 1981); United States v. White, 237 F.3d 170, 173–74 (2d Cir. 2001)
(criminal); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 177–82 (2d Cir. 1996) (OSHA); United
States v. Funmaker, 10 F.3d 1327, 1330–32 (7th Cir. 1993) (criminal). The Eighth Circuit seemed to
follow the reasoning of Coeur d’Alene without citing its rule expressly. See EEOC v. Fond du Lac
Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 248–51 (8th Cir. 1993). Various district courts have also
relied on the Coeur d’Alene approach. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fortune Bay Resort Casino, 688 F. Supp. 2d
858, 865–71 (D. Minn. 2010); Pearson v. Chugach Gov't Servs., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 467, 474–77 (D.
Del. 2009); United States v. Fox, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1257–59 (D. N.M. 2007). In San Manuel
Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit declined to expressly adopt the Coeur d’Alene
formulation, but reached a result consistent with Tuscarora. 475 F.3d 1306, 1311–15 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(applying the NLRA to tribal casino). For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit’s twist on these approaches,
see infra note 117.
107. Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 (“[T]he tribal self-government exception is designed to
except purely intramural matters such as conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and
domestic relations from the general rule that otherwise applicable federal statutes apply to Indian
tribes.”). See Reich, 95 F.3d at 179–80; Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 892 F.2d 1457, 1463
(10th Cir. 1989). The tribal-governance exception derives from courts’ recognition of innate
sovereignty of domestic dependent nations. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55–56
(1978) (“Indian tribes are distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights in matters of local self-government. Although no longer possessed of the full attributes of
sovereignty, they remain a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (1980) (citing Santa Clara
Pueblo for this proposition); Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 (citing Farris). But this exception is
limited, since the “right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad
power of Congress.” E.g. Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980)). The Ninth Circuit, for example,
has described its limited scope by noting that it applies “only in those rare circumstances where the
immediate ramifications of the conduct are felt primarily within the reservation by members of the tribe
and where self-government is clearly implicated.” Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892, 895 (9th
Cir. 2004).
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intent.109 In this way, the Tuscarora/Coeur d’Alene rule serves the same
function as the presumption against extraterritoriality—disambiguating
statutes that do not specify their reach—albeit by establishing both a
default rule and formal exceptions to it.110
Tracking the discussion of extraterritoriality, the next step is the
Morrison/Libman question: when do we apply the extranationality
presumption? In Libman, the court remarked that the facts of the case were
“here and there,” and then articulated a rule to sort future cases as either
here or there (thus avoiding the presumption or applying it). For
extranationality, we must sort cases into those to which the exceptions for
self-government, treaty rights, and congressional intent apply, and those to
which they do not. For example, a court could say that the exceptions to the
rule are not available if conduct occurs or effects are felt outside the
reservation or by non-tribal members. Alternatively, a “focus test” could
ask whether the events comprising the focus of the statute occurred on- or
off-reservation.
A review of the cases in which federal courts have wrestled with this
question does not reveal a single, coherent rule.111 While extraterritoriality

108. Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1117 (“We also ‘presume[] that Congress does not intend to
abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties when it passes general laws, unless it makes specific
reference to Indians.’”) (quoting Farris, 624 F.2d at 893). The treaty exception is grounded in this
Supreme Court’s admonition that “[a]bsent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely
reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights.” Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assoc., 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979). However, courts have
required that the Indian tribe identify a specific treaty right that would be violated by the application of
the statute. E.g., Menominee Tribal Enters, 601 F.3d at 671–74; Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425, 343–
48 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Smiskin, 487 F.3d at 1264–70; Smart, 868 F.2d at 934-35 (7th Cir.
1989). Note that the treaty exception allowed the Coeur court to reconcile its holding with Navajo
Forest, since that decision eschewed Tuscarora’s presumption in the face of a conflict treaty right.
Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1117 (quoting Navajo Forest, 692 F.2d at 711).
109. Farris, 624 F.2d at 893-94 (asking the tribe to prove congressional intent by “legislative
history or some other means”). See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1485–86 (9th Cir. 1995)
(examining legislative history, including House Conference Report No. 95-1778 (1978)).
110. Professor Bryan H. Wildenthal has laid out an excellent case for why courts should reject the
Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene approach, relying instead on a series of Supreme Court pronouncements since
the Tuscarora decision. Bryan H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law, Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons
of Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413 (2007). This author has no quarrel with Professor Wildenthal that
there is a good argument that the Supreme Court could reject the Coeur d’Alene approach if given the
opportunity. But to date, it has not done so, and courts of appeals continue to cite this line favorably.
E.g., Menominee Tribal Enters. v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669, 671–74 (7th Cir. 2010). Furthermore, as a basis
for new approaches to transborder law, Coeur d’Alene is equally useful whether or not it is wholly
endorsed by the Supreme Court.
111. The Second Circuit’s summary of its holding in Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel
highlights the complicated factors that make up the “mosaic” of this inquiry: “These separate tiles—the
nature of [the tribal entity’s] work, its employment of non-Indians, and the construction work on a hotel
and casino that operates in interstate commerce—when viewed as a whole, result in a mosaic that is
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is necessarily a question of “location,” territory appears to be a relevant—
but not conclusive—factor for extranationality.112 Indeed, some decisions
expressly hold that off-reservation conduct does not defeat a tribal
defendant’s ability to invoke an exception to the presumption.113 Similarly,
tribal identity—which could track notions of nationality that also apply to
international prescriptive jurisdiction—is important but not dispositive.114
distinctly inconsistent with the portrait of an Indian tribe exercising exclusive rights of self-governance
in purely intramural matters.” 95 F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 1996).
112. E.g., Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians v. Utah, 428 F.3d 966, 984–86 (10th Cir. 2005)
(Lucero, J., concurring) (framing the issue as whether the Highway Beautification Act applies to
“Indian lands”); Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d at 892 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting the significance that the
primary conduct and effects were located on-reservation, but also recognizing that some off-reservation
conduct would not defeat the exception); Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d
490, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1993) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (arguing the significance of off-reservation claims);
EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 250 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he ADEA
does not apply to the narrow facts of this case which involve a member of the tribe, the tribe as an
employer, and on the reservation employment.”) (emphasis added); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United
States EPA, 803 F.2d 545, 546-50 (10th Cir. 1986) (discussing whether an EPA rule applies to “Indian
lands”).
Territory plays a vexing role in other Indian law issues as well. In tax cases, the Supreme Court has
noted that the interest balancing test applied to on-reservation taxation in White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), does not apply to taxation of off-reservation activity. See Wagnon v.
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 112 (2005) (commenting on the “significant
geographical component” of Indian sovereignty) (citation omitted). Meanwhile, as the D.C. Circuit
observed, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on state law and on-reservation activity treats the location
of the activity as a primary consideration, but “this consideration was expressly tied to preserving tribal
self-government, which the court defined in terms of the right of Indians to be ruled by their own laws.”
San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1313–14 (D.C. Cir. 2007). As noted by
Professor Florey, the Court has tended to deemphasize territoriality in Indian law cases. Florey, Indian
Country, supra note 3.
113. E.g., United States v. Smiskin, 487 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that treaty rights
preclude the application of a federal statute to tribal members’ transport of cigarettes even though some
of the transport occurred off-reservation); Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d at 892 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
off-reservation conduct does not defeat the exception).
114. E.g., Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d at 894 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the significance of primary
Indian plaintiffs but also holding that presence of non-Indian plaintiffs does not defeat the exception);
EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1081 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering the dispute to be
“intramural because it involved the tribal government and a member—“it does not concern non-Karuks
or non-Indians as employers, employees, customers, or anything else.”); Reich , 95 F.3d at 176-77 (2d
Cir. 1996) (suggesting that presence of non-Indian employees countenances against, but does not
necessarily preclude, the application of the intramural exception); EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip.
& Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 250 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he ADEA does not apply to the narrow facts of
this case which involve a member of the tribe, the tribe as an employer, and on the reservation
employment.”) (emphasis added). See also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684–88 (1990) (holding that
tribal criminal jurisdiction did not apply to non-members and collecting cases on other topics in Indian
law drawing the member/non-member distinction); Judith Resnik, Symposium: Tribes, Wars, and the
Federal Courts: Applying the Myths and the Methods of Marbury v. Madison to Tribal Courts’
Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 77, 116 (2004).
With respect to tribal identity, courts have been asked to apply the Coeur d’Alene rule to (a) tribal
members, United States v. Smiskin, 487 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Funmaker, 10 F.3d
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Moreover, none of the cases discussing Tuscarora and Coeur d’Alene
inquire into due process considerations. Instead, a review of the case law
suggests a different theme: courts tend to apply Tuscarora/Coeur d’Alene
to cases that demonstrate a connection to the tribe as a metaphysical,
sovereign, self-governing entity. Each of the Coeur d’Alene exceptions
tracks the courts’ understanding of native sovereignty—an understanding
under which limited tribal sovereignty is tied not to territory or nationality,
but instead to the necessity of the power to “protect tribal self-government”
and to “control internal relations.”115
Turning first to the intramural affairs exception, courts have
specifically linked this rule to notions of sovereignty and selfgovernment.116 For this reason, some off-reservation conduct or effects, or

1327 (7th Cir. 1993); (b) tribal governments, Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2004);
NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Taylor v. Ala. Intertribal
Council Title IV J.T.P.A., 261 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); and (c) tribal businesses,
Menominee Tribal Enters. v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2010); Florida Paraplegic Ass’n v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 1999); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel,
95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir.
1993); Lumber Industry Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Products Indus., 939 F.2d 683 (9th Cir.
1991).
115. Mont. v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). Over the years, the Supreme Court has
referred to tribal sovereignty with a range of modifiers, such as “quasi-sovereign,” Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974), “retained sovereignty,” Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
212 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and “primeval sovereignty,” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 328 (1978).
116. The Ninth Circuit, which expresses the dominant approach to this issue, invokes the exception
for intramural affairs only in cases where the tribe’s self-governance is impinged. Snyder v. Navajo
Nation highlights this point. 382 F.3d at 896 (9th Cir. 2004). Tribal members employed as tribal lawenforcement officers sued their employer under the FLSA. The Court ultimately held that the FLSA did
not apply, invoking the exception for purely intramural matters. The court noted that this exception
usually applies only “where the immediate ramifications of the conduct are felt primarily within the
reservation by members of the tribe and where self-government is clearly implicated.” Id. at 895.
However, in this case, the court was willing to look past the off-reservation conduct because of the
centrality of self-government: “[S]uch services performed off-reservation nevertheless relate primarily
to tribal self-government and remain part of exempt intramural activities. . . . Employed by an arm of
the tribal government, officers serve the tribe’s governmental need for law enforcement to promote the
welfare of the tribe and its members.” Id. at 896 (citation omitted). Similarly, the court also overcame
the presence of non-Indian plaintiffs (employees) because the officers “serve the interests of the tribe
and reservation governance.” Id. In sum, despite the presence of non-Indian plaintiffs and offreservation conduct, the court applied Coeur d’Alene’s first exception to protect the tribe’s right to selfgovernment. See also EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The
Housing Authority thus functions as an arm of the tribal government and in a governmental role. It is
not simply a business entity that happens to be run by a tribe or its members, but, rather, occupies a role
quintessentially related to self-governance.”).
Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s dalliance with shielding states and localities from the
FLSA for traditional government functions (e.g. police) lasted less than decade, expiring with Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). So at least the Ninth Circuit (and the Seventh Circuit in Reich v. Great
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some connections to non-Indians, do not doom the claim to this exception.
In the words of Morrison, what a craven watchdog this exception would be
if it retreated to its kennel whenever some non-Indian activity was involved
in the case. Sovereignty and internal affairs, therefore, are the hallmarks of
this exception.117
The same emphasis on sovereignty and internal affairs defines the
second exception—treaty rights. The elevation of treaty rights necessarily
reflects the tribe’s sovereign authority, differentiating the tribe from a runof-the-mill private entity. Some courts have held that treaty rights (and
hence the exception) inure only to the tribe as a whole, not to individual
tribe members.118 Again, native sovereignty is limited—deriving not from
territory or nationality but from self-governance and sovereignty, and
always subject to the express will of Congress. This is not to say that
individual rights are disserved by these approaches—more on that later—
but only that courts have relied on notions of sovereignty to craft the
exceptions.
B. Canada
Like the United States, Canada has a native population, a reserve
system, and a legal approach to extranationality.119 Canada’s 1867
Constitution Act gave Parliament exclusive authority over “Indians, and

Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1993)) believes that the Tuscarora rule
provides more insulation for tribal affairs than the Tenth Amendment provides to the states on the same
issue.
117. The Tenth Circuit, meanwhile, has framed the Tuscarora/Coeur d’Alene test in a different
way, applying the three exceptions only where the tribe is acting in a proprietary (rather than sovereign)
capacity. See Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 600 F.3d 1275, 1293 (10th Cir. 2010)
(Briscoe, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186
(10th Cir. 2002) (en banc). This alternative formulation, though, does not reflect a fundamental
disagreement between the circuits. Instead, the issue here is the blurry line between cases that touch on
a tribe’s exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters (Coeur d’Alene #1) and tribal
immunity. All of these courts of appeals recognize a zone of tribal affairs that must be protected, and
they define that zone with reference to tribal sovereignty and self-government, but they get there in
different ways.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (D. N.M. 2007) (rejecting defendant’s
individual claim to treaty right in felon-in-possession prosecution); United States v. Three Winchester
30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 504 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974) (same). But see United States v.
Smiskin, 487 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying the treaty-rights exception to individual tribal
members). For a discussion of tribal, rather than individual rights in federal Indian law generally, see,
e.g., Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, supra note 87; Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to
American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365, 379 (1989).
119. See, e.g., Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5, § 2 (Can.); Patrick Macklem, Distributing
Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1321-22 (1993)
(discussing Canadian Indian law). As above, tribal immunity is not addressed here.
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Lands reserved for the Indians.”120 And the historic default rule was that
Canadian laws of general application applied to native populations—
another presumption in favor of extranationality.121
The 1982 Constitution Act added a new dimension to this default
presumption. Specifically, Section 35(1) constitutionalized aboriginal
rights: “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples
of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”122 Not only does
constitutionalization
protect
these
substantive
rights
from
extinguishment,123 it also limits the power of the federal and provincial
governments to infringe upon them. In so doing, it limits the presumption
in favor of extranationality. How exactly Section 35 changed Canada’s
approach to extranationality was spelled out in the four-step analysis of the
famed Sparrow decision and its progeny.
The first two steps in the Sparrow approach define the relevant
substantive rights. Step one requires courts to determine if an aboriginal or
120. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c.3 (U.K.) § 91(24) (Can.).
121. E.g., Delgamuukw v. B.C., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, ¶ 179 (Can.); R. v. Francis, [1988] 1 S.C.R.
1025 (Can.); Four B Mfg. Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of Am., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031 (Can.). In
addition, at least before the 1982 Constitution, the federal government could extinguish aboriginal
rights through “clear and plain” enactments. E.g., Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, ¶ 173; R. v.
Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (Can.) (citing inter alia Attorney-General for Canada v. AttorneyGeneral for Ontario, [1898] A.C. 700 (U.K.)).
Canadian courts originally held that provincial laws of general application did not apply to cases
touching on a core of Indianness. These courts interpreted the Constitution as excepting native
populations and territories from provincial control; through the notion of “interjurisdictional immunity,”
the provinces may not legislate on topics expressly reserved for Parliament. E.g., Delgamuukw, 3
S.C.R. 1010, ¶ 179; R. v. Sutherland, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 451 (Can.). See also Kerry Wilkins, Of
Provinces and Section 35 Rights, 22 DALHOUSIE L.J. 185, 207–208 (1999). Even in this period,
Canadian courts permitted provincial laws of general application to infringe—but not extinguish—
aboriginal rights even prior to the Indian Act. Following the passage of the Indian Act, the Canadian
courts lifted the “core of Indianness” exception to the default rule for provincial laws. Indian Act,
supra note 119 § 88 (Can.) (“Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws
of general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of
Indians in the province . . . .”). See JOHN J. BORROWS & LEONARD I. ROTMAN, ABORIGINAL LEGAL
ISSUES: CASES, MATERIALS & COMMENTARY 521-54 (2d ed. 2003). In short, Section 88 federalized
provincial laws, thus avoiding interjurisdictional immunity by dint of parliamentary authority.
Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. 1010, ¶¶ 180-83; Dick v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309, ¶¶ 39–41 (Can.); Catherine
Bell & Clayton Leonard, New Era in Metis Constitutional Rights: The Importance of Powley and Blais,
41 ALTA. L. REV. 1049, 1059–60 (2004); Wilkens, supra note 121 at 207–08, 220–21. Yet even in the
era of Section 88, provinces still may not extinguish tribal rights. See, e.g., Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R.
1010, ¶ 183.
122. Constitution Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) § 35(1) (Can.).
123. E.g., R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, ¶ 28 (Can.) (“Subsequent to s. 35(1) aboriginal
rights cannot be extinguished . . . .”); University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, Primer: Canadian
Law
on
Aboriginal
and
Treaty
Rights
12
(2009),
available
at
http://www.law.ubc.ca/files/pdf/enlaw/primer_complete_05_10_09.pdf (hereinafter “Primer”) (“Section
35 now protects these rights from extinguishment by unilateral federal legislation.”).
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treaty right is indeed at issue. The meaning of “treaty right” is fairly selfevident.124 While Sparrow suggested a liberal interpretation of “aboriginal
rights,” more recent cases have limited the term to “element[s] of a
practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the
aboriginal group claiming the right.”125 To prove that an activity is
“integral,” the group must show that the activity holds “central
significance” and exhibits continuity with pre-contact activities.126 Once the
right is recognized, at step two the court must ensure that the right is
“existing,” as required by the Constitution.127 Rights that have been
properly extinguished cannot serve as the basis for an aboriginal claim.
The third and fourth steps evaluate the alleged infringement of the
“existing aboriginal or treaty right.” The court in Sparrow adopted a
burden-shifting framework for these final two steps. Step three asks
whether there has been a “prima facie infringement,” and places the burden
of showing the infringement on the party asserting the aboriginal right.128 If
that party is successful, in the fourth step the burden shifts to the
government to show that the infringement was justified.129 To be justified,
124. See R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, ¶ 64 (Can.) (holding that the same Sparrow test
applies to aboriginal and treaty rights); R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, ¶¶ 73–88 (Can.) (applying
Sparrow and its progeny with respect to a treaty right).
125. R. v.Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, ¶ 46. See Manus, supra note 96 at 13–17, 26–31
(tracking the Canadian Supreme Court’s narrowing of the aboriginal-rights concept). See also BORROW
& ROTMAN, supra note 121 at 345-428 (discussing the characterization of aboriginal rights by the
courts); Patrick Macklem, Aboriginal Rights and State Obligations, 36 ALTA. L. REV. 97 (1997)
(advocating for a positive-rights approach to Section 35(1) and Sparrow); Morse, supra note 96, at 126–
27 (discussing aboriginal-rights claims).
126. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, ¶¶ 55–67. See also Andrew Lokan, From
Recognition to Reconciliation: The Functions of Aboriginal Rights Law, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 65, 96–
97 (1999) (summarizing factors applied in Van der Peet). “Aboriginal title” is a specific type of
aboriginal right. E.g., Delgamuukw v. B.C., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, ¶ 2; Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2
S.C.R. 335; Calder v. B.C., [1973] S.C.R. 313. For further discussion of aboriginal title, see Alisia
Adams, Unforgiven Trespasses: Provincial Statutes of Limitations and Historical Interference with
Indian Lands, 7 APPEAL: REV. CURRENT L. & L. REFORM 32, 34 (2001); Jacqueline F. Pruner,
Aboriginal Title and Extinguishment Not So “Clear And Plain”: A Comparison of the Current Maori
and Haida Experiences, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 253 (2005); BORROWS & ROTMAN, supra note 121
at 1-100.
127. E.g., R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (“The word ‘existing’ makes it clear that the rights
to which s. 35(1) applies are those that were in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982 came into
effect.”).
128. In R. v. Sparrow, the court outlined illustrative questions: “First, is the limitation
unreasonable? Second, does the regulation impose undue hardship? Third, does the regulation deny to
the holders of the right their preferred means of exercising that right?” [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
129. Id. (“The justification analysis would proceed as follows. First, is there a valid legislative
objective? . . . If a valid legislative objective is found, the analysis proceeds to the second part of the
justification issue. . . . That is, the honour of the Crown is at stake in dealings with aboriginal peoples.
The special trust relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-à-vis aboriginals must be the
first consideration in determining whether the legislation or action in question can be justified.”).
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an infringement must further a “compelling and substantial” objective and
be consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary duty to the aboriginal
population.130 This is not the forum to assess the intricacies of the
justification requirement; it suffices to say that the protection of aboriginal
and treaty rights bends to compelling governmental justifications.131
Canadian courts have highlighted a number of sources of and
justifications for its approach in these cases. In Sparrow itself, the court
remarked on the need to “hold[] the Crown to a high standard of
honourable dealing with respect to the aboriginal peoples of Canada,”
“uphold the honour of the Crown,” and “guarantee that those plans treat
aboriginal peoples in a way ensuring that their rights are taken
seriously.”132 The court recognized that these issues must be viewed in light
of a history in which tribal rights “were virtually ignored” and during
which courts were often stripped of the power to evaluate claims of Crown
sovereignty.133 In Gladstone, the court noted that “[a]boriginal rights are a
necessary part of the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the broader
political community of which they are part.”134 The court went on to say
that “limits placed on those rights are, where the objectives furthered by
those limits are of sufficient importance to the broader community as a
whole, equally a necessary part of that reconciliation.”135 Notably, these
explanations focus on community (rather than individual) and substantive
(rather than procedural) rights.
In any event, if one looks beyond the language of the Sparrow test, a
familiar picture emerges. Canadian courts have held that laws of general
application apply to tribal lands unless they conflict with aboriginal or
treaty rights. In other words, the court established a presumption with
carve-outs from the default rule, much like U.S. courts have done in
applying Tuscarora.136 In fact, the Canadian carve-outs for aboriginal or
130. Id. See Delgamuukw v. B.C., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, ¶¶ 160-64.
131. In his exceedingly instructive article, Professor Peter Manus explains how the Canadian
Supreme Court has made it easier for the government to satisfy this burden, while making it more
difficult to establish aboriginal rights. See Manus, supra note 96. See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. B.C.,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, ¶ 165 (“[T]he development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric
power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the
environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign
populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose and,
in principle, can justify the infringement of aboriginal title.”).
132. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
133. Id.
134. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, ¶ 73.
135. Id.
136. Indeed, just as the dissenting opinion in Tuscarora ended with the weighty quotation about
“great nations” keeping their word, the Delgamuukw majority opinion concluded with the pithy
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treaty rights resemble the Coeur d’Alene exceptions: both rules recognize
an exception for treaty rights, and Canadian law protects “integral” parts of
aboriginal culture while U.S. law protects “the exclusive rights of selfgovernance in purely intramural matters.” These exceptions are not
coterminous: U.S. courts are concerned with self-government (rather than
culture), while Canadian courts have not acknowledged self-government as
“integral” to native culture.137
The Canadian courts’ attention to native culture also plays out in their
answer to the Morrison/Libman question. Canadian jurisprudence with
respect to aboriginal rights focuses not on territory but on the nature of the
activity in question and its cultural significance to the tribe.138 In Sparrow,
for example, a member of the Musqueam Indian Band was cited for a
regulatory violation of the Fisheries Act arising out of his activities outside
the Musqueam reservation (but within traditional fishing areas).139 In
assessing this case, the court eschewed territorial considerations to
acknowledge an “existing aboriginal right to fish for food and social and
ceremonial purposes.”140 In this way, Canadian courts share the American
courts’ emphasis on tribal (not only individual) rights, but they recognize
these substantive rights connected to tribal history, customs, and
traditions.141
Finally, we pause briefly on the Canadian government’s policy
response to these issues.142 The government issued a formal statement of
policy, which begins: “The Government of Canada recognizes the inherent
right of self-government as an existing Aboriginal right under section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982.”143 Despite this recognition, the government
does not waiver from the view that general laws apply to the tribes.144 The

admonition: “Let us face it, we are all here to stay.” Delgamuukw v. B.C. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, ¶ 186.
137. See John Borrows, Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 537, 574–75 (1999) (contrasting the Canadian Supreme Court’s treatment of
Crown sovereignty (excessive and general) versus tribal sovereignty (not)).
138. E.g., R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, ¶¶ 55–67.
139. R, v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
140. Id.
141. For example, Sparrow is a case about an individual’s claim to an aboriginal right, but the
court sought to define the scope of the “Musqueam right to fish.” Sparrow, 1 S.C.R. 1075.
142. Aboriginal Affairs & Northern Development Canada Webpage. The Government of Canada’s
Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government,.
http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/ldc/ccl/pubs/sg/sg-eng.asp (last modified Sep. 15, 2010).
143. Id.
144. Id. (“The Government takes the position that negotiated rules of priority may provide for the
paramountcy of Aboriginal laws, but may not deviate from the basic principle that those federal and
provincial laws of overriding national or provincial importance will prevail over conflicting Aboriginal
laws.”).
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policy goes on to say that the government will seek negotiated agreements
on the scope of the inherent right of self-government, rather than litigating
its precise contours,145 and calls for the participation of native populations
and provincial governments in this process.146 In other words, the
government will negotiate future exceptions to the default rule that general
laws apply to native populations.
C. Australia
Australia tells a drastically different story. Indeed, Australian
indigenous peoples law lacks some of the key elements that would make it
useful as a comparison to American and Canadian approaches to
extranationality. Thus it will not feature prominently in the comparative
analyses that follow. For these reasons, this Section will merely touch on
Australian law as a foundation for future research.
For more than two centuries following Captain Cook’s landfall,
Australia was treated as a “settled colony.” General laws applied to native
peoples; those laws applied to the exclusion (or extinguishment) of existing
native laws; and no formal exceptions were made for aboriginal rights.147
Moreover, under this original conception, native populations were not
sovereign or self-governing entities—or even domestic-dependent
nations—and they were not owed fiduciary obligations as peoples.148 One
consequence of this view was that treaties were not negotiated with native
145. Id. (“[T]he central objective of negotiations will be to reach agreements on self-government
as opposed to legal definitions of the inherent right.”).
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Walker v. N.S.W. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 45, ¶¶ 2-6; Mabo v. Queensland, (1992) 175
C.L.R. 1, ¶ 36; Coe v. Commonwealth, (1979) 24 A.L.R. 118, ¶ 12; Report No. 31: The Recognition of
Aboriginal Customary Laws, AUSTL LAW REFORM COMM’N ,June 12, 1986, at ¶¶ 1, 39-40, available at
http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/report-31 (hereinafter “ALRC Report”); DAVID LANHAM, ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAWS IN AUSTRALIA 90-95 (2006). The seminal decision of R. v. Jack Congo Murrell
confirmed that general criminal law applied to the murder of one aboriginal by another, R. v. Murrell, 1
Legge 72 (1836) N.S.W., and the High Court reiterated this position over the years since Murrell, e.g.,
Mabo, 175 C.L.R., para 36; Coe, 24 A.L.R., para 12 The Australian Constitution originally assigned to
the states the power to legislate with respect to native populations, but a 1967 referendum expanded
Parliament’s authority to include this power. Australia Constitution Act s 51(xxvi). See generally John
Williams & John Bradsen, The Perils of Inclusion: The Constitution and The Race Power, 19 ADEL. L.
REV. 95 (1997) (discussing the history of this clause); Michael Legg, Indigenous Australians and
International Law: Racial Discrimination, Genocide and Reparations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 387,
393-94 (2002) (discussing the referendum). See also ALRC Report, ¶¶ 906-69 (discussing federal and
state legislative regarding aboriginals).
148. E.g., Mabo, 175 C.L.R., ¶ 36; id. ¶¶ 86-93 ( Dawson, J.) (rejecting the American and
Canadian conceptions and concluding that “there is no room for the application of any fiduciary or trust
obligation”); Coe, 24 A.L.R., para 12 (rejecting aboriginal sovereignty); id. para 42 (rejecting the notion
of a fiduciary duty). See also Julie Cassidy, Aboriginal Title: “An Overgrown And Poorly Excavated
Archeological Site”?, 10 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 39, 75-84 (1998).
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groups.149 Therefore, the American and Canadian approaches to
extranationality could not exist in Australia: there was no recognition of
aboriginal rights from which exceptions could be drawn, nor were there
treaties with which general laws could conflict.150
A major development in aboriginal law was the High Court’s 1992
decision in Mabo v. Queensland. In Mabo, the High Court held, for the first
time, that Australian common law recognized prior land rights in native
peoples—so-called “native title.”151 Native title is a limited, usufructory
right that applies only to land and water to which there is a claim
recognized by traditional law and to which the native peoples maintain a
connection.152 In this way, the Australian courts account for native interests
not through conceptions of native sovereignty or exceptions to general laws
(as in the United States and Canada), but instead through a property rights
regime.153 Yet, as Professor Tarlock argues, this usufructory right is less
powerful than the hard property rights that characterize parts of U.S. Indian
law jurisprudence.154

149. See, e.g., Coe, 24 A.L.R., para 12; ALRC Report, supra note 147, ¶ 39; Brynna Connolly,
Non-State Justice Systems and the State: Proposals for a Recognition Typology, 38 CONN. L. REV. 239,
253-56 (2005); William D. Wallace, M’Intosh to Mabo: Sovereignty, Challenges to Sovereignty and
Reassertion of Sovereign Interests, 5 CHI.-KENT. J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 21-23 (2005) (collecting cases,
statutes, and legal policies); Sean Brennan, Brenda Gunn & George Williams, ‘Sovereignty’ and its
Relevance to Treaty-Making Between Indigenous Peoples and Australian Governments, 26 SYDNEY L.
REV. 307 (2004).
150. For a useful comparison between American Indian law and Australian Aboriginal law, see
Tarlock, A Comparative Perspective, supra note 96.
151. 175 C.L.R. 1. See, e.g., Manus, supra note 96 (discussing native title in Australia, Canada,
and the United States); Andrew Erueti, The Demarcation of Indigenous Peoples’ Traditional Lands:
Comparing Domestic Principles of Demarcation with Emerging Principles of International Law, 23
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 543 (2006) (discussing comparative law of native land claims); Wallace,
supra note 9 at 26-28; Sean Brennan, Native Title and the Acquisition of Property under the Australian
Constitution, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 28 (2004); Cassidy, supra note 148. Following Mabo, the
Australian Parliament codified this concept in the Native Title Act. Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). See
W. Austl. v. Ward [2002] H.C.A. 28, ¶ 468 (summarizing the effect of the Act). In Western Australia v.
Commonwealth, the High Court held that, with minor exception, the Native Title Act was
constitutional. (1995) 183 C.L.R. 373.
152. Native Title Act, 1993, s 223(1). See Ward, [2002] H.C.A. ¶ 19; Commonwealth v. Yarmirr,
(2001) 208 C.L.R. 1. The High Court remarked that under the Act “[t]he spiritual or religious is
translated into the legal.” Ward, [2002] H.C.A. ¶ 19. Notably, the criteria for establishing native title
are not dissimilar from Sparrow’s test for identifying an aboriginal right.
153. See Coe v. Commonwealth, (1993) 118 A.L.R. 193, para. 27. See also Members of the Yorta
Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422, ¶¶ 37-38 (discussing sovereignty since
Mabo); Wik Peoples v. Queensland ("Pastoral Leases case") (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1 (Kirby, J.); Walker,
182 C.L.R., para. 2; Mabo, 175 C.L.R., ¶¶ 36 & 83; id. ¶¶ 2-4 (Deane & Gaudron, JJ.); id. ¶¶ 1-6
(Dawson, J.); id. ¶¶ 14-21 (Toohey, J.).
154. See Tarlock, Tribal Justice, supra note 96, at 476-77.
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D. Comparative Extranationality
Before turning to a fuller discussion of extraterritoriality and
extranationality in Parts III and IV, it is helpful to pause to consider the
findings of this Part with respect to extranationality alone. Putting aside
Australia for the reasons articulated in Section C, it is notable that both the
American and Canadian courts have adopted presumptions in favor of
extranationality. Moreover, both states recognize formal exceptions to this
presumption. In the United States, courts allow exceptions for intramural
matters, tribal rights, and legislative intent; in Canada, the Constitution
permits exceptions to protect aboriginal or treaty rights. This notion of
carve-outs (deriving from constitutional protections, the common law, or
treaties) is foreign to the extraterritoriality regimes reviewed in Part I.
Lastly, the courts in both states have begun to answer the threshold
Morrison/Libman question, though neither state has formally resolved the
issue.
This Part also highlights how courts conceptualize their government’s
relationship to the native populations. The rights protected by American
and Canadian laws are linked to the status of native peoples as political or
cultural groups. The United States and Canada have signed treaties with
native peoples as (somewhat) sovereign entities. Moreover, the courts in
both states recognize a fiduciary duty that their governments owe to their
native populations.155 Putting these facts together, a picture emerges of
native peoples as peoples possessing some quasi-sovereign attributes.
Indeed, it is this characterization that best describes the courts’ answers to
the Morrison/Libman question. In this way, extranationality and
extraterritoriality share something of a common lineage, with “foreign”
sovereignty at the heart of both interpretive regimes. At the same time,
155. For the United States, see, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195 (1993) (referring to a
fiduciary obligation owed to all tribes); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983)
(“undisputed existence of a general trust relationship”); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S.
286, 296 (1942) (“distinctive obligation of trust”); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913)
(“[The law] attribute[s] to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of
exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders . . .
.”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886) (“These Indian tribes are the wards of the
nation.”) (emphasis omitted). See generally Eugenia Allison Phipps, Note, Feds 200, Indians 0: The
Burden of Proof in the Federal/Indian Fiduciary Relationship, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1637 (2000); Notes,
Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 422 (1984). But see United
States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973) (discussing fiduciary duty owed to individual Indians). The trust
relationship betrays this tribe-level focus, arising out of Congress’ plenary power to regulate commerce
“with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
For Canada, see, e.g., Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335,349-50 (Austl.) (“[T]he Crown has a
fiduciary obligation to the Indian Bands with respect to the uses to which reserve land may be put and
that s. 18 [of the Indian Act] is a statutory acknowledgment of that obligation.”); id. at 336-37 (Dickson,
J.) (discussing the fiduciary relationship between the government and the Band).
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courts from neither country treat the native populations as truly
independent nations. Otherwise we would expect a presumption against
extranationality, rather than rules that only except tribes in limited
circumstances, reflecting a limited sovereignty that is dependent on the
fully-sovereign domestic state.
Examining the American and Canadian extranational regimes, the
bases of the tribal rights exceptions present a notable contrast. Both the
United States and Canada create exceptions from their default rules for
tribal rights, but Canada excepts rights integral to native culture while the
United States excepts intramural matters of tribal governance.156 While
U.S. law more generally recognizes some inherent sovereignty deriving
from tribes’ status as domestic-dependent nations, Canadian courts (even
since Sparrow) have not acknowledged inherent tribal self-government.
Indeed, in 1992, Canadian voters defeated a proposed constitutional
amendment that would have accorded Indians greater rights of selfgovernance.157 Further comparative research on indigenous peoples may
reveal other ways in which the American and Canadian approaches diverge
with respect to notions of self-governance.
Two other contrasts between the American and Canadian approaches
merit brief comment here. First, after applying the presumptions, Canadian
courts permit the government to overcome the exception with a compelling
justification; U.S. courts have no explicit “savings” rule.158 Second,
although Canadian law expressly acknowledges that aboriginal rights are
not absolute, it is noteworthy that Canadian aboriginal rights are
constitutionalized while their American counterparts may be infringed or
extinguished by any federal statute.159 So, although this Article has focused
so far on statutes with ambiguous reach, the limits of the Canadian
Constitution and Sparrow apply to all legislation, ambiguous or not.
III. COMPARATIVE EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND
EXTRANATIONALITY
Part II of the Article began with some brief comments linking
international and native peoples law and an admonition that scholars and
156. This divergence may not be limited to transborder law issues. For example, Professor Felix
Cohen identified four general principles of U.S. Indian law: “(1) The principle of the legal equality of
races; (2) the principle of tribal self-government; (3) the principle of Federal sovereignty in Indian
affairs; and (4) the principle of governmental protection of Indians.” Cohen, supra note 92, at 3.
Notably, cultural rights are absent from this list.
157. See Brad W. Morse, A View from the North: Aboriginal and Treaty Issues in Canada, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 671, 678 (1995).
158. Whether there is one in practice is another matter.
159. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 96, at 124 (noting this distinction).
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policymakers have insufficiently plumbed the depths of this comparison.
This Part picks up that challenge based on observations regarding
extraterritoriality and extranationality.
Comparisons between international and indigenous peoples law on
this basis are necessarily modest. Any conclusions comparing attitudes
toward foreign states and native peoples cannot rely on the single question
of the transborder application of law. Even within the scope of this
question, this Article has looked primarily at judicial responses; a
comprehensive comparison between extraterritoriality and extranationality
would need to include a full account of the frequency and intensity with
which legislatures explicitly legislate extraterritorially and extranationally
and the frequency and intensity with which executives attempt to enforce
laws across borders.
Those caveats aside, this Article reveals a salient difference between
extraterritorial and extranational jurisprudence with respect to the
orientation of the respective default rules. For extraterritoriality, the courts
of all three countries frame the question as whether the legislature intended
an ambiguous law to apply extraterritorially, and in each of the countries
the courts presume that the legislature did not intend to do so. For
extranationality, U.S. courts presume that Congress intended general laws
to apply to native populations; Canadian courts start with this same
presumption, and have layered on top a constitutional approach that still
permits justified intrusions on aboriginal rights. In short, the courts
generally follow a presumption against extraterritoriality and a
presumption in favor of extranationality. Why?
At first blush, the answer may seem obvious: the presumption against
extraterritoriality tracks “real” borders between states while the
presumption in favor of extranationality reflects less-significant
subdivisions within a state. In short, there is a fundamental distinction
between an international border and an internal, indigenous one. This
distinction may influence the courts’ thinking on transborder law, and
future comparative research on foreign states and native peoples can dig
deeper into the nature and effects of this predisposition.
Although there certainly is some truth to this perception, it cannot be
the whole answer. For one thing, international and indigenous peoples law
are not wholly explained by this simple, binary construction: on issues
from sovereign immunity to treaty interpretation to the reach of foreign or
native law, courts do not simply accord full respect to foreign states and
none to indigenous peoples. The rules used to answer these and other
related questions are not uniform and permit more nuance than a simple yes
or no. Further double-comparative research can apply this Article’s
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analytical framework to other common questions.160
With respect to the issues covered in this Article, a pure foreignversus-native dichotomy would predict simpler rules governing the
transborder application of law than those described above. If international
borders were impenetrable, then courts would not seek out legislative
indications of extraterritoriality (express or implied), and there would be no
disputes regarding which nuanced definition of territoriality determines
when the presumption applies. Nor would we expect judicially-developed
exceptions to the presumption in favor of extranationality if tribal
constructions were meaningless. What, then, explains the rules as
articulated?
Courts have not given clear explanations for these outcomes, but it is
possible to assess extraterritorial and extranational jurisprudence with
respect to some broader themes. One important area of inquiry relates to
the courts’ role in the separation of powers. In foreign affairs, it is common
wisdom that courts take a cautious approach to foreign relations.161
Consistent with this idea, a modest judiciary might take steps to avoid
making a splash in foreign affairs (adopting a presumption against
extraterritoriality), but also might defer to the judgments of the political
branches (permitting extraterritoriality when the legislature says so
expressly).162 This deferential theory also rightly predicts that U.S. courts
seem to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality more loosely in
cases brought by the government than by private actors.163 Meanwhile,
courts have not exhibited the same reluctance to participate in the
governance of native peoples, and instead have invoked the obligations of
states (e.g. as a guardian or trustee) to justify further interference in native
affairs. In this way, the courts may be more likely to support a presumption
160. For example, in her exceedingly helpful article, Katherine J. Florey summarizes the history of
tribal immunity in U.S. law, and contrasts it with both foreign sovereign immunity and domestic
sovereign immunity as applied to the states and the federal government. Indian Country, supra note 3.
See also John W. Borchert, Comments, Tribal Immunity through the Lens of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: A Warrant for Codification?, 13 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 247 (1999).
161. See, e.g., David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds.,
1996); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (noting “the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations”).
162. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 18, at 120-22 (discussing the separation-of-powers justification
for the presumption against extraterritoriality). See also Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The
Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2009) (using this separation-of-powers
theory in the context of foreign-affairs federalism). That being said, Professor Brilmayer makes the
case that the Supreme Court’s Morrison decision “marginalize[d] Congress” in favor of “showcas[ing]
judicial creativity.” Brilmayer, supra note 68, at 656.
163. See Clopton, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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in favor of extranationality both as a matter of authority and as a proxy for
their own willingness to participate in cases without express approval from
the legislature or executive.164 Future double-comparative research can look
more deeply at the domestic institutional relationships that underpin these
two types of “foreign” relations.
Another relevant interest is that of the individual defendant or
regulatee. Due process is one frame through which individual interests may
be evaluated. Although courts have not articulated due process as a basis
for the presumption against extraterritoriality, the overzealous application
of domestic laws abroad is contrary to the notion that individuals should
have notice that they are subject to a particular set of laws.165 Extranational
cases present less of a notice problem: there is simply less concern that
individuals will be unaware that domestic laws apply on native territory. In
this light, it is not surprising that courts eschew a default rule against
extranationality, though again they do not do so with specific reference to
due process. However, not all extranational cases are created equal. For
example, defendants might reasonably think they were outside the reach of
domestic law when acting in relation to aboriginal cultural rights,
intramural tribal affairs, or topics expressly reserved by treaties for tribal
control—i.e., those topics that comprise the Canadian and American
exceptions.166 In this way, both the extraterritorial and extranational rules
may reflect individual rights considerations.
Lastly, this Article has suggested throughout that sovereignty is
central to any assessment of transborder law. The presumption against
extraterritoriality must be located within a larger sphere of foreign affairs
questions, and the sovereign equality of states is a fundamental principle of
international law and foreign relations. The history of the presumption and
its justification of avoiding conflict with foreign laws manifest this respect
for sovereign equals. This principle of international sovereign equality is
not matched by an equivalent principle respecting native peoples. Indeed,
as described in Part II, courts in all three states have declined to grant true
sovereign status to the tribes. However, to the extent that courts have
developed exceptions to the presumption in favor of extranationality, they
164. Notably in this connection, even as Canadian courts have softened the presumption, they have
expressly protected their government’s most significant priorities through Sparrow’s justification prong.
165. See Colangelo, Unified Approach, supra note 6 (collecting sources addressing due process).
Indeed, Professor Colangelo recommends a “unified approach” to extraterritoriality in which due
process (notice) and statutory interpretation become one inquiry.
166. An alternative formulation might be that the exceptions to the extranationality rules reflect the
protection not of due process rights, but of substantive rights that have independent significance. Under
either formulation, one question for future research is whether the Canadian or American approaches
better approximate lay notions of jurisdiction and notice.
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address the areas where tribal governments have the most sovereignty—
inherent (but limited) sovereignty over internal affairs or important cultural
matters, or negotiated sovereignty in the form of treaty rights.
The norm of sovereign equality is important in itself but also in its
practical manifestation as a concern for the problem of inconsistent
regulation.167 Again, on the international side, courts justify the
presumption against extraterritoriality with reference to concerns about
conflict with foreign law, recognizing that each state may regulate its
territory as it sees fit. In a “guardian-ward” arrangement between the
national government and a tribe, however, the courts may be less concerned
about conflict with native laws than with the absence of law. Professor
Judith Resnik, for example, situates certain Indian law decisions in a longer
tradition of the U.S. Supreme Court taking “jurisdiction by distrust,”
suggesting that the federal courts will assert jurisdiction to review state or
tribal cases where they lack confidence in the underlying systems.168
Whether the “absence of law” is a real phenomenon (resulting from a lack
of legal authority) or a perceived one (stemming from a historical view of
the tribes as unenlightened and unable to govern themselves), the
presumption in favor of extranationality could be seen as filling a void not
present in cases involving foreign states.169 Indeed, a “jurisdiction by
distrust” approach would explain not only the courts’ presumption in favor
of extranationality, but also their desire to identify exceptions to the rule—
perhaps the courts have more trust in tribal systems on the core areas of
Indianness that populate the exceptions to the American and Canadian
rules. Further research can explore this version of the sovereignty thesis
and its relationship to other interests in international and indigenouspeoples law.170
167. As Professor Florey rightly notes, this aspect of the sovereignty interest in tangled up with
notions of due process as well. Florey, State Courts, supra note 7, at 1113-19.
168. Resnik, supra note 114 at 108-09 (discussing, in this connection, Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). One interesting topic for future research would explore this distrust
thesis with respect to the recognition and enforcement of foreign (or tribal) judgments in national
courts. For example, the common-law rule for the enforcement of foreign judgments in the United
States does not provide for uniform outcomes, instead calling upon the court to assess the foreign
proceedings and the foreign system of jurisprudence. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03
(1895).
169. A confounding factor, for which further research is required, is that many federal Indian law
decisions are as focused on the federal-state question as the domestic-tribe one. See, e.g., Kagama, 118
U.S. 375 (1886). At least regarding extranationality, Canadian courts have not faced this issue since the
Indian Act federalized general provincial laws vis-à-vis the tribes. See Constitution Act supra note 120.
170. For example, in the context of the Florey-Rosen debate, Professor Florey suggests that dueprocess or state-sovereign interests tend to move in parallel. Florey, State Courts, supra note 7, at
1113-19. That trend seems to be matched in these cases, although further research is necessary to
unravel the correlation-causation question.
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The foregoing paragraphs offer an account of the presumption against
extraterritoriality and the presumption in favor of extranationality. Yet, as
this Article has made clear, antecedent to the presumption is the question
whether the presumption applies at all: the Morrison/Libman question. On
the extraterritoriality side, the American and Canadian courts use the
Morrison/Libman question to account for the interest of the forum state.
Morrison cabins the presumption based on the territorial location of the
focus of statute, reflecting the idea that Congress’ interest, as defined by
the statutory text, trumps countervailing concerns of individuals and
foreign states. Libman eschews a strictly territorial approach, accounting
for national interest by looking for a connection to Canada. As explained in
Part I, Libman is consistent with a due process account, but fundamentally
it too reflects the forum state’s interest in the case. So, while the
presumption against extraterritoriality itself admits the sovereign interests
of foreign states and the individual rights of putative defendants, the courts
have taken to narrowing the scope of the presumption on the basis of
domestic state interest, although they have done so in different ways.
With respect to extranationality, the American and Canadian
approaches take different tacks. When deciding whether or not to apply the
presumption in favor of extranationality, U.S. courts look not to domestic
interests (as in Morrison and Libman) but to tribal ones. The threshold
question in U.S. courts is whether the connection to the tribe is strong
enough, not whether the interest of the United States is so weak as to give
way. Canadian extranational jurisprudence splits the difference, applying
the exceptions where the case has a sufficient connection to native peoples,
but also acknowledging the importance of national interest by permitting
the government to justify any intrusions it may make. In further contrast to
Morrison and Libman, the extranational exceptions in the United States and
Canada are defined more by metaphysical considerations than by territorial
connections (either to the forum state or to native territory). This deemphasis of territory parallels a broader trend in federal Indian law in the
United States.171
This Part has laid out some initial conclusions on extraterritoriality
and extranationality that offer both substantive and procedural models for
further double-comparative work. At the same time, even this first cut at

171. Professor Florey has documented the complex issues of territory in American Indian law, and
the recent trend to deemphasize territory in favor of other conceptions of tribal sovereignty. Florey,
Indian Country, supra note 3. For an excellent discussion of the importance of territoriality in
international-legal issues, see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of
Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631 (2009), and for a discussion of other areas of law where
extraterritoriality matters, see Brilmayer, supra note 68.
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double-comparative research offers models for policymakers in both areas
of law.
IV. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND EXTRANATIONALITY
ROADMAP
While the academic conclusions described in Part III necessarily
require further study, the observations in this Article can serve as the basis
for recommendations to all three branches of government. I turn to those
practical suggestions here.
A. The Legislative Branch
Although this Article has focused on the courts’ approaches to
extraterritoriality and extranationality, the legislature may play the central
role. Not only can the legislature overcome the “constraints” of statutory
interpretation with express provisions, but the entire goal of statutory
interpretation is to discern legislative intent.
Given that the presumptions are tools to find legislative intent, a
natural recommendation to legislators would be to define the geographic
scope of each statute they enact. Or, perhaps less obviously, the legislature
could also enter the presumption business. As mentioned above, the
Australian Commonwealth and various Australian states have adopted
formal interpretation acts that include a presumption against
extraterritoriality, and the Canadian Criminal Code includes a similar
presumption. These are examples of legislatures codifying common law
presumptions. Could the United States Congress do the same? Could
legislatures answer the Morrison and Libman question by statute?172 And
should there be legislative solutions for extranationality?
In a 2002 article, Professor Rosenkranz concludes that a federal
interpretation act would be constitutional under U.S. law.173 Professor
Rosenkranz starts from an important (and often overlooked) premise:
statutory interpretation is not necessarily an exclusively judicial task. The
legislature can and should play a role in the process.174 Professor
172. The question of territoriality would be a particularly useful area for legislative intervention
given that there appears to be a finite number of likely rules, but significant differences in outcomes
depending on the rule adopted.
173. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2085 (2002). For additional discussion of legislative canons, see Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the
Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341 (2010).
174. In its simplest form, the legislature participates in interpretation when it includes a definition
section in a statute. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2011) (“General Provisions” of the U.S. Code including
rules of interpretation for words denoting number, gender, and tense, and certain definitions); Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (establishing rules of statutory
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Rosenkranz goes on to recommend that Congress adopt an interpretation
act that codifies particular canons of interpretation.175 He argues that as
long as the rules adopted do not conflict with constitutionally-rooted
canons, then the statute should not present a constitutional problem.176
Seemingly, a presumption against or in favor of extraterritoriality could be
safely adopted because it would not raise any constitutional issues;
presumably legislatures could codify presumptions with respect to
extranationality as well, with the exception of the protection for aboriginal
rights ensconced in the Canadian Constitution.
A legislative solution to extraterritoriality or extranationality would
have a number of positive consequences. As a threshold manner, it would
relieve courts of the task of divining legislative intent. This outcome has
intuitive appeal: why have an independent body try to guess at legislative
intent when the legislature can answer the question itself? Professor
Rosenkranz lists a number of additional advantages of congressional rules,
but the most relevant here is that the legislature “is best positioned to assess
and compare the efficiency of various interpretative rules.”177 While this
author might say that Congress is best positioned to assess and compare the
merit of various interpretative rules—expanding the inquiry beyond
efficiency—the underlying point is the same: Congress should weigh the
various equities and decide on rules in advance.
This preference is particularly true for the topics addressed in this
Article. Foreign policy is a notoriously weak point for courts, and the
assessment of potential conflicts with foreign laws is the sort of weighing
that the legislature could address in the first instance. Therefore, this
solution responds to both foreign law and legislative intent—the two
justifications of the presumption against extraterritoriality.178 Meanwhile,
Congress has a plenary, fiduciary responsibility to native peoples. In that
light, a resolution to the issue of extranationality could be part of a larger
native affairs project, much like Canada’s federal policy.
interpretation for statutes that substantially burden the free exercise of religion). Rosenkranz also
collects interpretative codes from all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. Rosenkranz, supra
note 173, at 2089 n.10.
175. Rosenkranz, supra note 173 at 2148-50. Professor Rosencrantz specifically suggests that
Congress select canons from the list provided in your author’s favorite law-review chart: Karl
Llewellyn’s “Trust but Parry.” Id. at 2148 (referring to Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV.
395, 401-06 (1950)).
176. Rosenkranz, supra note 173, at 2109-26.
177. Id. at 2145. See also Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1133, 1151 (2010) (supporting legislative approaches to state extraterritoriality).
178. The codification of an interpretative canon should have no effect on the due-process
interest—that issue will depend on the content of the rule.

CLOPTON FINAL VERSION 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

260

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/20/2013 11:03 AM

[Vol 23:217

A legislative approach also may allow for creative approaches. The
extranational jurisprudence discussed here exemplifies one strategy for
addressing the reach of statutes: a default presumption with specific carveouts. American, Canadian, and Australian courts have not adopted this
strategy for extraterritoriality, but legislatures certainly could do so without
needing to wait for just the right series of cases to percolate to the high
courts. An interpretation act could include a rule that says “the presumption
against extraterritoriality applies to all ambiguous statutes except for laws
related to antitrust or competition . . .” Or, taking a cue from Professor
Colangelo, it could provide that “the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies to all ambiguous statutes except for laws implementing or enforcing
international law.”179 Additionally, legislatures could adopt rules that treat
different enforcement mechanisms differently: an interpretation act could
apply different presumptions to enforcement actions brought by the
government versus civil actions brought by private plaintiffs,180 or
expressly permit the courts to consider a compelling government
justification as the Canadian court did in Sparrow.181 While courts could
adopt creative rules with exceptions or justification tests, legislatures can
do so expressly in coherent, generalizable statutes. Moreover, although
interest group lobbying is often viewed with a jaundiced eye, the legislative
process is better positioned than a bilateral proceeding in a common law
court to respond to multifarious interests on a single issue.
In sum, legislatures may be in the best positions to establish default
interpretative rules; they are well positioned to respond to the specific
issues that animate extraterritorial and extranational judicial decisions; and
the nature of legislative action may allow them to adopt more creative and
innovative approaches than courts would likely apply on their own.

179. See Colangelo, Unified Approach, supra note 6.
180. If a legislature was inclined to rely on the executive branch to handle extraterritorial (or
extranational) issues, it could also include a qui tam-like provision in which individuals could bring
extraterritorial civil-enforcement issues to the attention of the executive branch and then share in any
recovery obtained thereafter. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2010) (quit tam provision in the False
Claims Act). See generally, Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public
Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949 (2007); Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional
Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381 (2001); J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the
English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539 (2000); Evan Caminker, The
Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (1989).
181. Congress took a similar tack in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1(b) (“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person— (1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”).
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B. The Executive Branch
As described in this Article, the courts are on the frontlines of
extraterritoriality and extranationality and the legislatures are, at a
minimum, commanding the process from headquarters. But the limited
attention paid to the executive should not be read as understating that
branch’s role. Criminal and civil enforcement actions brought by the
executive frequently touch on extraterritorial or extranational issues, and in
foreign affairs the executive branch is often regarded as the primary actor.
What, then, should executive actors take from this Article?
A seemingly unavoidable question is what sort of deference, if any,
courts should grant to executive action. Will courts evaluate
extraterritoriality or extranationality differently in cases where the
executive, rather than a private party, brings the case? As discussed above,
U.S. courts appear to be less likely to throw out criminal cases than civil
cases based on the presumption against extraterritoriality. In one of his last
opinions on the Court, Justice Stevens indicated in Morrison that he would
likely have ruled differently had the case been brought by the SEC.182 In
Canadian extranational law, deference manifests itself in a different form:
courts permit the government to abridge constitutional aboriginal rights
based on a compelling justification.183
While as a formal matter it is for the courts or the legislature to
announce the deference due to executive actions, the executive branch
nonetheless plays an important role in this process. Not only is it likely that
the executive will request deference from the courts,184 but it is also quite
possible that the courts’ deference will depend on how and when the
executive lays out its positions. For example, one could imagine courts
182. 130 S. Ct. at 2894 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court’s opinion does
not, however, foreclose the Commission from bringing enforcement actions in additional
circumstances, as no issue concerning the Commission’s authority is presented by this case.”). Going
further, Judge Kavanaugh has argued that the Charming Betsy canon “should not be invoked against the
Executive Branch, which has the authority to weigh international-law considerations when interpreting
the scope of ambiguous statutes.” Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(concurring in denial for rehearing en banc).
183. Interestingly, there appears to be a circuit-split among the U.S. appellate courts with respect
to the relationship between the Indian canons and Chevron deference. Compare Cobell v. Norton, 240
F.3d 1081, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the Indian canon trumps the Chevron doctrine) with
Shields v. United States, 698 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1983) (declining to apply the Indian canon in light of
contrary agency interpretation). See Kristen A. Carpenter, Symposium: Native American Sovereignty
Issues: Interpreting Indian Country in State Of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73
(1999) (discussing this circuit split).
184. See, e.g., Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC v. Aramco (Nov.
15, 1990) (Nos. 89-1838 & 89-1845), 1990 WL 511330 at *22-*24 (citing prior EEOC and Justice
Department interpretations of the extraterritoriality of Title VII in support of the government’s
interpretation of the statute).
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giving less deference to executive interpretations of statutes offered
exclusively as litigating positions, as opposed to interpretations offered ex
ante in administrative decisions or informal policy statements.185 In fairness
to the due process rights of potential defendants and out of respect to other
sovereigns with an interest in the case, executive actors should be
encouraged to stake out their positions in advance. And in deciding upon
the substance of these positions, the executive should recall the individual
rights and sovereign interests that these doctrines protect. In other words,
the executive should heed Professor Buxbaum’s observation that
territoriality is not just a geographic principle but it also expresses “a
specific understanding about fairness and legitimacy in cross-border
regulation.”186
Finally, the discussion of the executive would not be complete without
mentioning the starring role it plays with respect to treaties. All three
countries’ courts apply a presumption against the violation of international
law (which includes international treaty law), and U.S. and Canadian
extranational decisions recognize exceptions for treaty rights. There is no
reason that treaties could not address some of the statutory-reach issues that
have occupied this Article. In a recent article, Professor Colangelo calls for
courts to unify international substantive and jurisdictional law by applying
international jurisdictional limits (and no presumption against
extraterritoriality) to domestic laws enforcing substantive international
treaties.187 An even more “unified approach” would involve putting
jurisdictional limits into the treaties themselves.188 In other words, treaties

185. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 16, at 186-88 (discussing so-called Chevron deference in the
context of extraterritoriality). See also Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the
Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783 (2011); Eric A. Posner & Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein,
Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663 (2005); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron
Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2000).
186. Buxbaum, supra note 171, at 674.
187. Colangelo, Unified Approach, supra note 6.
188. Notably, certain international agreements include provisions that appear to provide
legislative-jurisdictional rules. E.g., U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 5, CAT/C/28/Add.5, at 43-44 (Feb. 9, 2000). See also
Colangelo, Unified Approach, supra note 6 at 56-60 (discussing jurisdictional provisions in the
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation). And
states have drafted or adopted international agreements related to other issues of jurisdiction—Europe
addresses jurisdiction issues in European Council Regulation No. 44/2001, while the Hague Conference
on Private International Law has addressed issues from choice of courts to service of process, see
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.listing (list of conventions) (last visited Jan. 27,
2013). Relatedly, Professor Coyle has argued for choice-of-law treaties in which states agree to enforce
choice-of-law clauses in commercial contract. John F. Coyle, Rethinking the Commercial Law Treaty,
45 GA. L. REV. 343 (2011).
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can address extraterritoriality and extranationality. States could negotiate
bilateral (or multilateral) treaties for the express purpose of resolving the
scope of extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction, they could include such
provisions in substantive multilateral treaties, or they could add
extraterritoriality provisions to extradition treaties. For extranationality, one
could imagine the Canadian government negotiating extranationality
exceptions in the treaties on self-government that form a central part of its
federal policy. Other states could do the same.189 In short, executives could
use “jurisdictional” treaty law to resolve issues of extraterritoriality and
extranationality and, in so doing, manifest fairness and legitimacy by
engaging with foreign states and indigenous peoples directly.
C. Judicial Branch
Lastly, we return to the judiciary. Proposals for clearly written
statutes, legislative interpretation acts, and executive policy statements will
only go so far—unless circumstances change dramatically, courts will
continue to face questions of extraterritoriality and extranationality. One
achievement of a review like this one, therefore, would be to provide a
menu of options for the courts. This Section will not rehash every nuance
of the six permutations previously outlined, but it will highlight a few
topics that merit specific attention.
First, a threshold issue for cases involving the extraterritorial
application of law is the meaning of “territoriality.” A number of answers
exist: territoriality could be defined by conduct, effects, conduct and
effects, the focus of the statute, or a real-and-substantial link. The
American and Canadian courts have addressed this choice for
extraterritoriality; the Australian courts should do the same, and the
equivalent question in native law cases also deserves more concerted
attention.
This survey also reveals different ways that presumptions can be
structured. Courts have tended to advocate straightforward rules for
extraterritoriality, but extranational jurisprudence demonstrates that other
options are available. Courts could identify carve-outs from default rules,
following the Coeur d’Alene route. Or they could adopt rebuttable
presumptions, taking a cue from Sparrow. While these suggestions also
may form the basis of legislation or executive decision-making, that should
not absolve courts of the responsibility to consider them as well. At the

189. Similarly, treaties with native peoples could spell out enforcement-jurisdictional limits that
will have the effect of shrinking the scope of statutes that could apply to them. See infra note 192
(discussing the treaty right to exclude).
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same time, the courts must consider the value of simplicity.190 Simplicity,
in this context, is not just about the terms of the rule—it must be judged in
the context of the overall legal environment. A U.S. court faced with the
extraterritorial application of a statute, for example, not only must address
the presumption (and the meaning of territoriality), but also the Charming
Betsy canon, due process, and a host of other issues. Given the existence of
these alternative protections for defendants, some scholars have argued that
the simplest approach would be to get rid of the presumption against
extraterritoriality altogether.191 While this formulation may overstate its
simplicity—“getting rid of” the presumption really means applying a
presumption in favor of extraterritoriality—its effect would be to shift the
action from statutory presumptions to prescriptive jurisdiction (Charming
Betsy) and constitutional law (due process), while maintaining a focus on
the two interests of sovereignty and individual rights.192
Next, a discerning reader may have noticed that the discussion of the
international law of prescriptive jurisdiction in the context of
extraterritoriality lacks a parallel in in the context of extranationality.
Perhaps such a parallel is warranted. In a few paragraphs at the end of his
William B. Lockhart Lecture, Professor Frickey suggests that, given the
international law roots of federal Indian law, courts addressing questions of
native peoples law should apply the Charming Betsy rule and presume that
Congress did not intend to violate international law when dealing with
native peoples.193 Professor Frickey made this argument with respect to
190. In Morrison, Justice Scalia was explicit in justifying the presumption against
extraterritoriality, in part, as “preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate with
predictable effects.” 130 S. Ct at 2881.
191. See supra note 67 (collecting examples). For alternative proposals, see, e.g., Jeffrey A.
Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 119 (2010) (proposing a “dual illegality rule” under which courts decline
to apply U.S. law to extraterritorial conduct unless that conduct would be illegal or similarly regulated
in the territorial state); John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L.
351 (2010) (advocating a three-tiered “presumption against extrajurisdicitonality”).
192. The extraterritorial application of law is also constrained in practice by enforcement
jurisdiction. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 401(c) (1987). A law
that may be applied extraterritorially is of limited utility if the state cannot take evidence abroad, serve
process abroad, or otherwise hale foreign defendants into national courts. Indeed, in her recent article,
Professor Buxbaum observes that German courts consider the statutory-interpretation question in
antitrust law expressly in connection with the limits on enforcement jurisdiction. Buxbaum, supra note
171, at 663-65. This notion is not limited to extraterritoriality: at least one U.S. court of appeals has
held that OSHA cannot be enforced on the Navajo Reservation because the tribe had a treaty with the
United States that included the right to exclude non-Indians—a limitation on enforcement jurisdiction.
Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products Industries, 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982).
193. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, supra note 87, at 92-93. Professor Cleveland
ponders a similar question in her opus on the Supreme Court’s application of “inherent powers” in cases
regarding Indians, aliens, and territories: “if the government’s constitutional authority derives from
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international human rights law. However, the international law of
prescriptive jurisdiction has also found a voice in the Charming Betsy
canon. Courts therefore could require litigants to identify a basis of
prescriptive jurisdiction under international law before applying ambiguous
statutes to native peoples. This approach would manifest the deep
connection between international and indigenous peoples law and could
better approximate individual and sovereign interests.
Throughout this Article, various approaches have been judged against
due process and sovereign interests. In many ways, however, foreign- and
native-affairs jurisprudence lags behind on these issues: exterritorial cases
do not address due process head on; courts are reluctant to acknowledge
anything but very limited native sovereignty; and due process is also absent
from extranational cases. One final recommendation, therefore, is for
courts to catch up. Courts should acknowledge that sovereignty and due
process are central interests to these related problems, and they should take
account of how their rules of interpretation play out on these metrics.
*

*

*

This Article has reviewed the extraterritorial and extranational
jurisprudence of the United States, Canada, and Australia for its own ends
and as a starting point for comparative research across international and
indigenous peoples law. The goals of this endeavor are to better understand
these two fields and to arm policymakers with creative approaches to
problems that may have gone stale. While the publication of this Article
may not be followed shortly thereafter by Congress adopting an
interpretation act for extranationality or the Australian High Court having a
Morrison/Libman moment—the latter seeming much more likely than the
former—hopefully this Article will nudge scholars and policymakers in
both fields to think more broadly about their own disciplines and about
other disciplines that can inform their work.

customary international law, should not the authority likewise be limited by customary international law
constraints?” Cleveland, supra note 80, at 280.

